Investment arbitration has become a central feature of the international legal framework governing foreign investment. It provides investors with a direct mechanism to bring claims against host states for breaches of treaty obligations, outside the domestic courts of the host state. Used prudently, it can act as a practical system of legal protections that operates alongside contracts and domestic law.

This first blog in a two-part series provides a practical overview of investment arbitration and the core protections typically available to investors under investment treaties.

The Nature of Investment Arbitration 

Investment arbitration allows a foreign investor to bring claims directly against a host state before an independent international tribunal. The state’s consent to arbitration is given in a contract with the investor in an international treaty concluded with the investor’s home state or with multiple states.

When an investor initiates arbitration under the investment treaty, a binding arbitration agreement is formed. This structure enables private parties to enforce obligations grounded in public international law against a state, as opposed to the traditional system where public international law principles could only be enforced by states, against states.

Who May Bring Claims and Against Whom

Investment treaties limit standing to qualifying investors who are nationals. For individuals, nationality is usually determined by citizenship. For companies, nationality is typically based on place of incorporation or seat, though some treaties impose additional requirements such as substantial business activity.

These definitions are critical. Jurisdictional objections frequently turn on whether the claimant qualifies as an investor under the treaty with ownership structures, control, and timing often closely scrutinised.

Depending on the terms of the treaty, claims can be brought against states for governmental action, whether through their ministries, regulators, courts, and other entities exercising governmental authority. Conduct by state-owned enterprises may also be attributable to the state in certain circumstances.

What Constitutes a Protected Investment

Treaties define the investments they protect. Most adopt a broad, asset-based definition inter alia covering shares, loans, contractual rights, concessions, licences, and intellectual property.

Tribunals nevertheless assess whether the alleged investment meets objective criteria, particularly where treaties refer to contribution, duration, and risk. Purely commercial transactions or short-term sales may fall outside the scope of protection.

The way an investment is structured, financed, and documented therefore has legal significance. Economic exposure alone cannot guarantee treaty protection.

Core Substantive Protections

While treaty language varies, most investment treaties include a core set of substantive protections that define permissible state conduct.

Protection Against Expropriation

Expropriation, simply, means the taking of property. Treaties generally prohibit expropriation except where it is for a public purpose, carried out in accordance with due process, non-discriminatory, and accompanied by compensation.

Expropriation may be direct, such as formal nationalisation, or indirect, where measures substantially deprive the investor of the use or value of the investment through indirect measures such as regulatory action, licence withdrawal, and the like, depending on their effect on the investor.

Fair and Equitable Treatment

Fair and equitable treatment is among the most frequently invoked standards. It protects investors against arbitrary, abusive, or fundamentally unfair conduct by the host state in which the investment has been made.

Tribunals have interpreted this standard to include respect for legitimate expectations, transparency, consistency, due process, and good faith. While modern treaties increasingly seek to define or limit this obligation, it remains a central protection against egregious conduct by the state.

Full Protection and Security

This standard obliges states to exercise due diligence in protecting investments. While historically focused on physical security, it has in some cases been extended to legal and institutional protection, particularly where systemic failures undermine the investment.

Most Favoured Nation (“MFN”) and National Treatment

Investment treaties often include the non-discrimination standards of MFN and national treatment as protections for investors.

National treatment obliges the state to treat foreign investors no less favourably than domestic investors in like circumstances. Claims often arise where regulatory measures, licensing regimes, or enforcement practices disadvantage foreign investors relative to local actors.

Most favoured nation treatment, on the other hand, requires the state to treat investors from the claimant’s home state no less favourably than investors from any third state. In some cases, this clause has been invoked to access more favourable protections found in other treaties, though this approach is increasingly restricted by treaty drafting. Tribunal have also diverged on whether such a reading of the MFN clause is permissible.

Both standards involve a contextual comparison, and differential treatment may be justified by legitimate regulatory objectives.

Procedural Protections and Access to Arbitration

Treaties provide investors with access to international arbitration, commonly under ICSID or UNCITRAL rules. This offers neutrality, enforceability, and insulation from domestic political pressures.

Treaties oftentimes have procedural requirements for the access to arbitration. Cooling-off periods, notice requirements, limitation periods, and jurisdictional thresholds must be respected. Failure to comply can result in dismissal regardless of the merits.

Conclusion

Investment arbitration operates alongside contracts and domestic remedies and in some cases contractual obligations can be elevated to treaty disputes (through a provision often referred to as an umbrella clause). However, in most instances, treaty claims are based on breaches of international law, not merely contractual non-performance. For most cases, the state’s conduct must result in a breach of treaty standards.

Investors should seek strategic input early as in their disputes choices made in domestic forums can nonetheless affect treaty rights as treaty protections are only available if the investor and investment fall within the treaty’s scope. That determination often depends on decisions made at the investment stage.

Understanding and prudently leveraging investment arbitration as a legal framework, rather than an emergency remedy, gives investors a further tool to manage sovereign risk in cross-border investments. In the upcoming article in this series, we will explore what considerations investors need to consider while structuring their investments.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations. 

KEY DEVELOPMENTS 

  • UK, US and EU sanctions developments following unrest in Iran: The UK confirmed it is reviewing the scope of its Iran sanctions response following reports of fatalities and mass arrests linked to unrest beginning in late December 2025; ministers indicated that existing designations remain in force and that further measures may be introduced. A House of Commons Library briefing outlined planned UK sanctions targeting sectors including finance, energy, transport and software, and referenced the October 2025 “snapback” of UN sanctions on Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. The US and EU also moved in parallel, with Washington imposing multiple sanctions targeting Iranian oil shipping networks, senior officials and digital asset platforms linked to repression and sanctions evasion, and EU governments preparing a new package of human rights-based measures. 
  • Sanctions evasion and enforcement challenges: Investigative reporting highlighted the limits of unilateral sanctions, revealing that a UK-designated Iranian businessman continues to control substantial European real estate assets outside the scope of EU sanctions; the case illustrates how complex ownership structures and divergence between UK and EU regimes can complicate asset freeze enforcement. 
  • Russia-related energy and sanctions developments: The EU formally adopted a phased ban on imports of Russian gas under the REPowerEU strategy, marking a significant escalation in energy-related sanctions. Western measures also continued to drive the forced divestment of Russian energy assets overseas. In the UK, enforcement activity remained active, with criminal proceedings scheduled in the luxury goods sector, amendments to the UK Sanctions List, and a court judgment confirming that compliance with Russia sanctions can provide a lawful basis for refusing services. 
  • Regional and cross-sector sanctions actions: The US imposed sanctions targeting a Costa Rica-based cocaine trafficking and money laundering network, and separate measures against Hamas-linked entities in Gaza that are operating through purported humanitarian and nonprofit structures.
  • Global regulatory and general licence updates: The UK moved to a single authoritative sanctions list, discontinuing updates to OFSI’s consolidated  OFSI also revised the Russian oil price cap and imposed a monetary penalty on a UK bank for sanctions screening failures. In the US, OFAC issued a new general licence authorising narrowly defined transactions involving Venezuelan-origin oil, subject to detailed conditions and reporting requirements. 

GLOBAL SANCTIONS

IRAN 

  • On 13 January 2026, the UK government confirmed it is reviewing the scope of its sanctions response to developments in Iran following reports of fatalities and mass arrests linked to unrest that began in late December 2025. In a statement to Parliament, ministers indicated that existing UK sanctions targeting Iranian individuals and entities linked to human rights abuses remain in force, and that additional designations may be considered depending on further developments. The update reflects continued UK use of its autonomous Iran sanctions regimes, including asset freezes and travel bans, in response to assessed conduct by Iranian state-linked actors. 
  • A House of Commons Library research briefing published on 19 January 2026 outlines the UK and international response to widespread protests in Iran that began in late December 2025. The briefing notes that, alongside diplomatic condemnation of Iranian state violence, the UK Government has indicated it plans to introduce further sanctions targeting sectors including finance, energy, transport and software in response to human rights abuses and the regime’s actions. As at mid-January 2026, the UK had 286 individuals and 260 organisations on its Iran sanctions lists, including entities linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and groups deployed against protesters. The briefing also references the UK’s October 2025 decision, with France and Germany, to trigger “snapback” of UN sanctions against Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, reinstating broad multilateral measures that apply across UN member states. 
  • On 23 January 2026, the US imposed sanctions on nine vessels and their owners accused of transporting hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil to foreign markets through a “shadow fleet” of older tankers flagged in jurisdictions including Palau and Panama. OFAC stated that the measures were linked to Iran’s ongoing crackdown on nationwide protests and its unprecedented internet shutdown, which began on 8 January 2026 to suppress information sharing and conceal human rights abuses. US officials described the sanctions as targeting a critical revenue source used to fund domestic repression, underscoring Washington’s increasing focus on oil shipping networks that enable Iran to evade international restrictions and generate illicit export income. 
  • On 26 January 2026, investigative reporting by the Financial Times revealed that Ali Ansari, an Iranian businessman designated by the UK for allegedly financing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, controls a European real estate portfolio valued at approximately €400 million through a network of offshore holding companies. While UK authorities froze Ansari’s London assets following his designation, the investigation found that he is not currently subject to EU sanctions, allowing him to retain ownership of high-value properties in Spain, Germany and Austria, including hotels, a golf resort and a shopping centre. The findings, based on corporate filings across multiple jurisdictions, illustrate how complex ownership structures and gaps between UK and EU sanctions regimes can limit the practical reach of unilateral sanctions measures and complicate asset-freeze enforcement beyond national borders. 
  • 27 January 2026: EU governments are expected to approve a package of new sanctions against Iranian individuals and entities in response to the Iranian government’s violent crackdown on nationwide protests that began in late December 2025. The measures are anticipated to be adopted under the EU’s global human rights sanctions framework and are likely to target those responsible for or linked to the repression, including travel bans and asset freezes, though Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is not expected to be added to the list at this stage. The sanctions push reflects mounting EU concern over serious human rights abuses in Iran, complementing existing EU restrictions related to Iran’s nuclear and proliferation activities. 
  • On 30 January 2026, the US imposed new sanctions against Iranian officials and financial networks linked to the regime’s violent crackdown on nationwide protests. OFAC designated Iran’s Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni Kalagari and several senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and law enforcement commanders for their roles in repression and human rights abuses. The US also sanctioned Babak Morteza Zanjani, a prominent businessman accused of laundering funds for the regime, together with two UK-registered digital asset exchanges, Zedcex Exchange Lt and Zedxion Exchange Ltd., which allegedly processed significant volumes of IRGC-linked transactions. The US Treasury described the move as its first designation of a digital asset exchange connected to Iran, highlighting the growing US focus on the use of cryptocurrency platforms in an effort to support sanctions evasion as well as regime financing. 

KAZAKHSTAN 

  • On 28 January 2026, Kazakhstan’s government formally submitted a bid to US authorities to acquire stakes held by Russian oil producer Lukoil in major Kazakh energy projects, including interests in the Karachaganak and Tengiz oilfields and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, according to a report in Global Banking & Finance Review. The move comes as Lukoil, which was sanctioned by the US in October 2025, is required to divest its overseas assets under the terms of the sanctions regime and associated wind-down licence, with a deadline of 28 February 2026 for sales. Kazakhstan’s bid will require approval from the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) given the sanctions framework under which asset disposals must take place. The involvement of a sovereign state in a bid for sanctioned foreign energy assets reflects how sanctions are reshaping global energy ownership and investment dynamics, particularly in Central Asia where key energy infrastructure is jointly operated by Western and regional partners.

RUSSIA

  • 12 January 2026: The UK Crown Prosecution Service has scheduled a criminal trial in January 2028 against Hauser & Wirth’s UK subsidiary and a London-based art shipping company for alleged breaches of the UK’s Russia sanctions regime. Prosecutors allege that the gallery made a high-value artwork available in 2022 to a person “connected with Russia,” in contravention of the UK ban on the supply of luxury goods, including artwork, to such persons under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations. The alleged conduct relates to a work by George Condo provided between April and December 2022, a period after the UK introduced a prohibition on exporting luxury items valued over £250 to Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. A procedural hearing is set for 5 May 2026, when the defendants are expected to enter pleas, and the trial itself is scheduled for January 2028 at Southwark Crown Court. This case marks a significant test of sanctions enforcement in the UK luxury goods sector and reflects intensified scrutiny of corporate compliance with sanctions, particularly where luxury goods and art market participants are concerned. 
  • In Migita and others v JP Morgan [2026] 1 WLUK154, a judgment handed down on 16 January 2026, the Central London County Court dismissed discrimination claims arising from the bank’s refusal to onboard three Russian-born clients in 2023. The court accepted that the decision was driven by compliance with EU Russia sanctions, specifically the deposit restrictions under Regulation 833/2014, which prohibit EU-regulated banks from accepting deposits exceeding €100,000 from Russian nationals unless an exemption applies. Although the claimants alleged that the refusal amounted to unlawful discrimination based on nationality, the court found that onboarding would have been prohibited under the sanctions regime in any event. The case confirms that sanctions compliance can provide a lawful basis for refusing services, while highlighting the importance of clear internal reasoning and accurate external communications when sanctions restrictions are relied upon.
  • On 16 January 2026, the UK Government issued an update to the UK Sanctions List under the Russia sanctions regime, amending the entry for John Michael Ormerod. The individual remains designated and continues to be subject to an asset freeze and trust services sanctions. 
  • On 26 January 2026, the Council of the European Union formally adopted legislation introducing a phased ban on imports of Russian gas, covering both pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas. The measure forms part of the EU’s REPowerEU strategy to end dependence on Russian energy supplies. The ban will be implemented gradually, with initial restrictions taking effect shortly after the regulation enters into force and transitional arrangements applying to certain existing contracts to mitigate market disruption. A full prohibition on Russian LNG imports is expected from early 2027, with pipeline gas imports to be phased out by autumn 2027. Member states will be required to verify the origin of gas imports, notify authorities of any remaining Russian supply contracts, and submit national diversification plans by 1 March 2026. The regulation will apply directly across all EU member states following publication in the Official Journal. 
  • 28 January 2026: Western sanctions imposed on Russia’s energy sector in late 2025 are accelerating the forced unwind of major Russian oil companies’ overseas footprints, with Lukoil now marketing an estimated $22 billion portfolio of international assets across upstream production, refining, retail fuel networks, and joint venture stakes. According to Reuters, Chevron is in talks with Iraq over West Qurna-2, one of the world’s largest oilfields where Lukoil holds a 75% stake and is seeking improved contract terms before taking over operations, highlighting how sanctions-driven divestments are reshaping access to strategic energy infrastructure. Reports in early January 2026 also pointed to a potential bid led by Chevron alongside private equity firm Quantum Energy Partners, potentially splitting Lukoil’s international assets between them as restrictions on financing and operations continue to narrow Lukoil’s ability to maintain foreign holdings. 

SOUTH KOREA  

  • 26 January 2026: The US has announced plans to raise tariffs on imports from South Korea to 25%, up from the current 15%, citing delays in Seoul’s implementation of a bilateral trade agreement reached in 2025. The proposed increase would apply across a broad range of goods subject to the US “reciprocal tariff” framework, including automobiles, pharmaceuticals, lumber and other manufactured products. South Korea stated that it had not received formal notification of the tariff increase and has requested urgent consultations with Washington. The trade deal, which includes a US$350 billion South Korean investment commitment in the US, was submitted to South Korea’s National Assembly in November and is still under review. Market reaction was initially negative, particularly for Korean automotive manufacturers, though equity markets later recovered amid uncertainty as to whether the tariff increase will ultimately be implemented. 

COSTA RICA  

  • On 22 January 2026, the US imposed sanctions on a major Costa Rica-based cocaine trafficking and money laundering network responsible for transporting multi-ton quantities of cocaine from Colombia through Costa Rica to the United States and Europe. OFAC designated Luis Manuel Picado Grijalba, described as one of the Caribbean’s most prolific traffickers, along with his brother, key enforcers, and five Costa Rica-based entities used to facilitate drug shipments and launder proceeds. The designated entities include businesses operated by family members, such as fishing, investment, and commercial companies, as well as a beauty salon alleged to have served as a front for laundering illicit funds and notarising fraudulent transactions. The action underscores growing US focus on Costa Rica’s role as a transshipment hub and reflects coordinated efforts with the DEA and Costa Rican authorities to dismantle the financial infrastructure supporting regional narcotics trafficking.

GAZA  

  • On 21 January 2026, the US imposed new sanctions targeting Hamas’s covert support infrastructure, including nonprofit organizations in Gaza and an internationally active front group linked to Hamas’s political outreach abroad. OFAC designated six Gaza-based entities that purported to provide humanitarian and medical services but were found to be integrated into Hamas’s military wing and used to divert donor funds to support terrorist operations. The US also sanctioned the Popular Conference for Palestinians Abroad, described as a Hamas-controlled organization involved in organizing international flotillas and expanding Hamas’s influence within the Palestinian diaspora, alongside a UK-based senior official affiliated with its leadership. The designations reflect a growing focus on the exploitation of civilian and charitable structures to finance terrorism while posing heightened compliance risks for the humanitarian and nonprofit sectors. 

GLOBAL REGULATION/ TOOL UPDATES 

On 28 January 2026, the UK moved from a dual-list system to a single authoritative list for sanctions designations. Previously, UK designations were published in both the UK Sanctions List (maintained by the FCDO) and OFSI’s Consolidated List of Asset Freeze Targets. Following the change, the OFSI Consolidated List and its search tool has stopped being updated, and all new UK designations, amendments and de-listings are now being published only on the UK Sanctions List. 

General Licenses  

On 15 January 2026, OFSI revised General Licence INT/2024/4423849 governing the provision of maritime transport and related services for Russian crude oil and oil products where transactions comply with the oil price cap. The revised licence lowers the cap from USD 47.60 to USD 44.10 per barrel, with the new threshold applying from 23:01 GMT on 31 January 2026. To facilitate an orderly transition, OFSI has included a temporary wind-down period for contracts entered into before that time which meet the previous cap, allowing such activity to continue until 22:59 BST on 16 April 2026. OFSI also updated its Financial Sanctions FAQs and the Maritime Services Ban and Oil Price Cap industry guidance to reflect the revised cap. 

On 26 January 2026, the UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) imposed a £160,000 monetary penalty on Bank of Scotland plc, part of Lloyds Banking Group, for  breaching the UK’s Russia sanctions regime. The penalty follows an incident in February 2023 in which the bank opened and operated a personal current account for Dmitrii Ovsiannikov, a Russian national and former senior official who remains on the UK Sanctions List. Of the 24 payments processed through the account, totaling approximately £77,000, OFSI determined that the bank had made funds available to a designated person in contravention of financial sanctions prohibitions. The breach occurred because the account was opened using a British passport with a spelling variation of Ovsiannikov’s name, which was not reflected in the bank’s automated sanctions screening database, resulting in the initial failure to flag the customer as a designated person. The account was later identified during enhanced screening, the restrictions were applied, and the issue was voluntarily reported to OFSI by the bank, which contributed to the 50% reduction in the penalty from its original level. Lloyds has stated that it has strengthened its sanctions controls and screening systems following the incident. This case underscores the importance of robust name matching and screening processes, including handling of name variants and politically exposed person checks, for UK financial institutions subject to financial sanctions requirements. 

On 29 January 2026, OFAC issued General License No. 46 under the US’s Venezuela Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 591), authorising certain transactions ordinarily incident to the lifting, export, sale, transport, and refining of Venezuelan-origin oil by established U.S. entities, including dealings involving PdVSA and other blocked Venezuelan state-linked entities. The authorisation is subject to strict conditions, including that contracts must be governed by US law with dispute resolution in the United States, and that any payments to blocked persons must be made into designated Foreign Government Deposit Funds. The licence permitsrelated shipping, logistics, marine insurance, and commercially reasonable crude or product swap arrangements, while prohibiting non-commercial payment terms, digital currency payments, transactions involving Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, or certain China-linked joint ventures, and any dealings with blocked vessels. The licence also imposes detailed reporting requirements for any onward supply of Venezuelan oil outside the United States, underscoring continued regulatory scrutiny of sanctioned energy-sector activity.  

CONCLUSION 

We will track these developments and, by way of our monthly sanctions update, we will continue to offer timely insight into international sanctions measures, regulatory changes and enforcement trends shaping the global sanctions landscape. 

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.   

Retail media is no longer a niche marketing tool. These days, it has become a defining feature of modern retail environments, ushering in a new era where physical space and digital reach operate hand in hand. With Westfield Rise launching its global retail media platform, complete with hundreds of digital screens across flagship malls, Simon Media & Experiences expanding nationwide, Cineplex creating and selling advertising on digital screens in various high-traffic locations across Canada, and the retail media network owned by the Co-op Group in the UK, major landlords are now functioning as both property operators and media companies. Their centers are effectively becoming full-scale media networks, capable of delivering targeted content, sponsorships, programmatic advertising, and immersive shopper engagement.

For tenants, this evolution has profound implications. Digital screens, interactive displays, and AI-enhanced content strategies increasingly shape customer impressions before a shopper even steps inside a store. Yet in many organizations, the people who control the media infrastructure and the people who negotiate leases operate in separate silos. The leasing team handles square footage and rent; the media team owns screen locations, ad inventory, data collection tools, and content policies.

This divide can be confusing, but it can also be a source of significant opportunity for tenants who understand how to navigate it.

From Challenge to Opportunity 

This separation between leasing and media operations may initially seem like a challenge, but savvy tenants—guided by experienced brokers and counsel—are increasingly recognizing it as an opportunity. When engaged early, a landlord’s media team brings powerful capabilities to the table: brand storytelling, digital visibility, property-wide amplification, and integrated campaigns that extend far beyond the storefront itself.

By approaching retail media proactively rather than reactively, tenants can secure visibility, protect their brand, and capitalize on the growing sophistication of property-wide media networks. What first appears to be a point of friction often becomes a meaningful advantage when the conversation begins early and the tenant’s strategy is integrated into both leasing and media planning.

Early engagement also prevents tenants from being blindsided later. Without proactive negotiation, tenants may find their beautiful new storefront framed by competing ads or incongruent content—an outcome that is both jarring and avoidable.

For landlords, early coordination between leasing and media divisions enhances the guest experience, drives higher media performance, and minimizes friction in lease negotiations. In other words, collaboration turns retail media into a strategic asset for both sides. At the same time, today’s consumers increasingly crave real-world engagement: authentic, tactile experiences that break through digital fatigue. The rapid rise of in-store cafés and hospitality-style lounges illustrates this shift, offering moments of conversation, comfort, and even curated sensory experiences that draw people deeper into the physical environment.

Why Retail Media Is Surging Now

For years, retail media was synonymous with e-commerce and big-box operators who mastered data-driven advertising at scale. But destination retail centers—malls, lifestyle centers, entertainment districts—are now positioned to dominate the next chapter.

A confluence of forces explains why:

Post-pandemic consumer behavior—IRL!. After years online, shoppers are gravitating toward experiences that happen in real life.

AI-powered marketing. Brands need environments where digital and physical touchpoints reinforce one another.

High-traffic destinations. Major malls already function as gathering spaces; retail media simply unlocks their value as communication platforms.

The rise of experiential retail. Consumers increasingly expect more than a transactional visit. Coffee bars (as referenced above), children’s play zones, immersive activations, and new concepts like Simon’s planned “Netflix Houses” underscore this shift. These venues blend entertainment and retail through mini-golf, VR experiences, themed dining, and branded event spaces—driving foot traffic while deepening emotional connection to the property.

Westfield Rise, Simon Media, and Brookfield Malls exemplify the shift. Their networks transform static common areas into dynamic, data-rich environments—modern media channels that complement traditional retail leasing.

Why Media Rights Now Belong in the LOI

Historically, media rights were an afterthought, often addressed only after the lease was drafted. That approach is no longer viable.

By the time a lease reaches a tenant’s inbox, a landlord’s media policies are usually fixed, screen placements are installed, and category restrictions may already be in effect. Without addressing these issues earlier, tenants may lose key protections or opportunities.

For this reason, the Letter of Intent (LOI) has become the critical stage for shaping media-related terms. Addressing these points upfront preserves leverage and ensures that the physical premises and surrounding digital environment support the tenant’s brand.

Key areas to negotiate at the LOI stage include:

Control of Nearby Screens: The screens immediately adjacent to a tenant’s premises can significantly influence brand perception. LOIs should clarify:

  • Who controls those screens
  • Whether the tenant has the right to display its own content
  • Whether competitor ads can be blocked
  • Whether the tenant has approval or veto rights

Digital adjacency is the new storefront visibility; tenants should treat it with equal seriousness.

Content Standards and Category Restrictions. Without negotiated parameters, a tenant may be surprised to find its storefront next to visuals that clash with its brand identity or customer experience. The LOI should establish baseline content policies to prevent undesirable or conflicting placements.

Participation in—or Exclusion From—the Media Network. Some brands want guaranteed exposure within a property’s media program, while others prefer to stay out of the network altogether to avoid mixed messaging or brand dilution. The LOI should make this preference unmistakably clear, specifying whether the tenant intends to be included or to opt out, whether any fees apply to participation, and what opportunities may exist for seasonal placements or co-branded campaigns. Addressing these points upfront ensures the media strategy aligns with the tenant’s broader marketing objectives and avoids surprises once the lease is drafted.

Future-Proofing Technology Rights. Retail technology evolves at a rapid pace, and today’s state-of-the-art display can become outdated surprisingly quickly. To stay competitive, tenants should ensure the LOI preserves enough flexibility to upgrade their digital installations as needed, integrate emerging technologies into the store environment, and avoid repetitive or burdensome approval processes that slow innovation. Thoughtful future-proofing prevents operational bottlenecks and allows tenants to keep pace with technological advancements throughout the life of the lease.

Data, Privacy, and Cybersecurity Considerations. Modern retail media networks often collect analytics through Wi-Fi tracking, cameras, sensors, or other tools. Tenants must understand:

  • What data is gathered
  • How it is used and who it is shared with
  • Consumer disclosure obligations
  • Cybersecurity safeguards
  • Liability allocations under privacy laws

Given the pace of regulatory change, proactive clarity here is essential.

A Summary Media Rights Exhibit: A concise media exhibit attached to the LOI—covering screen control, tenant visibility rights, content standards, and data responsibilities—creates alignment early and prevents disputes during lease negotiation.

The Broker’s Evolving Role

Brokers increasingly serve as the essential bridge between a landlord’s leasing machinery and its media operations. As retail media becomes more integrated into the tenant experience, the most effective brokers are those who can spot—often before anyone else—whether a property operates a media network and how that network may affect visibility, brand adjacency, and overall tenant strategy. They know to ask for media maps, screen locations, and content policies early, and they understand how these details can influence everything from customer flow to competitive positioning.

This deeper literacy allows brokers to anticipate issues such as competitor ads appearing near a tenant’s storefront or missed opportunities for brand amplification. It also enables them to weave media considerations directly into the LOI, ensuring the document reflects not only the physical terms of occupancy but also the digital context that surrounds the premises.

In this way, the broker becomes more than a dealmaker—they become the quarterback of media negotiations, shaping outcomes that can materially enhance a tenant’s visibility and success within the center.

A Note for Landlords

Landlords and their media affiliates gain when they coordinate early and offer tenants a cohesive understanding of the property’s media infrastructure. Transparency builds trust, improves media monetization, and strengthens the broader tenant ecosystem. As media networks grow more sophisticated, consistency between leasing and media operations will become a defining competitive advantage.

Conclusion: Leasing in the Age of Screens

Retail leasing today includes two parallel environments: the physical space a tenant occupies and the digital landscape that surrounds it. As media networks like Westfield Rise and Simon Media continue their rapid expansion, the screens next to a store may influence customer behavior as strongly as the store design itself.

For tenants, the takeaway is simple: media rights are now a fundamental part of real estate strategy. Addressing them early—especially at the LOI stage—ensures control, visibility, and brand protection in an increasingly digital retail world.

Handled thoughtfully, retail media enhances storytelling, elevates customer experience, and differentiates brands in ways that traditional leasing alone cannot. In today’s environment, success depends not just on the space you lease, but on the screens that frame it.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.

An opt-out collective action on behalf of homebuyers is being prepared for filing in Q1 2026 in relation to the UK housebuilding sector, with Mark McLaren seeking certification as class representative. The proposed claim follows an investigation by the Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) into suspected potentially anti-competitive conduct by seven major housebuilders in connection with the sale of new-build homes across Great Britain.

The CMA investigation was closed following the acceptance of binding, forward-looking commitments. Importantly, the CMA did not make any finding of infringement, and the commitments were offered and accepted without any admission of liability.

Background

The proceedings have not yet been filed. However, claimant-side announcements indicate that the proposed claim is intended to build on a CMA investigation opened in February 2024 into suspected breaches of the Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act 1998, which prohibits agreements, decisions and concerted practices between undertakings which have as their object or effect the restriction, distortion or prevention of competition within the UK and which affect trade within the UK.

The investigation concerned seven of the largest housebuilders operating in Great Britain — Barratt Redrow, Bellway, Berkeley, Bloor, Persimmon, Taylor Wimpey and Vistry — which the CMA suspected may have engaged in exchanges of competitively sensitive information during the period from January 2022 to February 2024.

The collective proceedings are expected to seek damages on behalf of homebuyers on an opt-out basis, as is typical for claims of this nature.

Commitments vs infringement  

The CMA’s investigation did not culminate in a statement of objections or an infringement decision. Instead, it was closed following the acceptance of commitments under which the housebuilders agreed to cease the conduct giving rise to the CMA’s concerns and to implement certain forward-looking measures.

That distinction matters.

  • An infringement decision involves a formal finding by a competition authority that competition law has been breached, following a full investigation. Such decisions can be relied upon as binding findings of liability in subsequent “follow-on” damages claims.
  • By contrast, the acceptance of commitments brings an investigation to a close without any finding of infringement. Commitments are voluntarily offered, forward-looking in nature, and are accepted expressly without determining whether any unlawful conduct occurred. They do not establish liability and do not bind the court or tribunal in private damages proceedings. Any claim relying on commitments must therefore proceed as a stand-alone action, with infringement, causation and loss proved afresh.

Stand-alone rather than follow-on

The absence of an infringement decision means that any collective proceedings are likely to be framed as a stand-alone claim. The consequences are significant.

In a stand-alone action, the burden rests squarely on the claimant to establish every element of liability and loss from first principles. This includes defining the relevant markets, proving the existence of anti-competitive conduct, demonstrating its effects, constructing a credible counterfactual, and establishing causation and quantum of loss.

The fact that the housebuilders volunteered commitments does not give rise to any presumption of breach. Commitments are accepted without any finding or admission of infringement and do not shift the burden of proof in subsequent private damages claims.

Scope and defendants

At this stage, the contours of any eventual claim remain unclear. Public statements suggest that the claim may initially focus on the seven housebuilders that were subject to the CMA investigation. However, that position may evolve as the claim progresses towards filing.

It also remains to be seen whether the proposed class representative will seek to allege market-wide effects extending beyond the conduct examined by the CMA, potentially drawing in additional market participants based on alleged spill-over effects. Any such approach would materially increase complexity at the certification stage, sharpening issues around commonality, causation and proof of loss — particularly given the CMA’s express statement that its investigation did not extend to certain aspects of housebuilding activity.

Depending on how any claim is framed, limitation and temporal scope may also become contested issues, particularly given that the CMA’s investigation was confined to conduct alleged to have taken place during a relatively short, defined period between January 2022 and February 2024.

Certification

It may be tempting to assume that certification will follow as a matter of course because the proposed claim comes on the heels of a CMA investigation. That assumption would be misplaced, particularly in a stand-alone case.

There is now a substantial body of authority emphasising that certification is not a rubber-stamping exercise, especially in stand-alone cases. The Tribunal will scrutinise all aspects of the application, including: (i) the proposed common issues; (ii) the loss methodology; (iii) the credibility and class-wide applicability of the counterfactual; (iv) the suitability of the proposed class representative; (v) the funding arrangements; and (vi) the proposed approach to damages distribution.

Another central issue is likely to be the definition of the proposed class, and whether it is said to encompass all purchasers of new-build homes over a defined period, or only purchasers of properties developed by the investigated housebuilders. Geographic and temporal distinctions may also be required, given the localised nature of housing markets and the timing of the alleged conduct.

These questions go directly to commonality and manageability. Housing markets are inherently local. Pricing, incentives and sales practices vary materially by location and over time. Any attempt to aggregate claims across developments and regions will require an economic methodology capable of accommodating that variation without collapsing into individualised assessment.

Funding and strategic pressure

The claim is reportedly supported by third-party litigation funding from Burford Capital, a well-established funder in the UK collective actions market. As with other funded opt-out claims, the presence of third-party funding introduces an additional set of commercial incentives, including funder economics and return thresholds, which can shape litigation strategy and settlement dynamics.

Conclusion

The proposed opt-out collective action against UK housebuilders is likely to be one of the most closely watched cases of 2026.

The proximity of the proposed claim to the CMA’s decision is not coincidental. It reflects a now well-established trend in UK competition litigation in which regulatory scrutiny — even where it stops short of an infringement decision — is treated as a potential springboard for large-scale private damages claims. Earlier collective proceedings have drawn on market studies, sectoral reviews and regulatory investigations as part of the factual matrix relied upon at certification.

The Tribunal has accepted that such material can form part of the relevant background and may assist in demonstrating that a claim is not speculative. However, regulatory concern is not a substitute for pleaded infringement, and it does not relieve a class representative of the obligation to advance a coherent and workable case capable of clearing the demanding certification gateway.

For the housebuilders, the proposed claim comes at a time of sustained regulatory and policy pressure on the sector, including fire safety remediation obligations, the self-remediation contract and the forthcoming Building Safety Levy. It underscores the cumulative pressures facing the industry and the environment in which any litigation will be defended.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.

California lawmakers continue to expand workplace protections, increase enforcement authority, and raise the stakes for noncompliance. As we turn the page on 2025, employers face a combination of new statutory obligations, expanded employee rights, and enhanced penalties, along with several laws that have already taken effect but now require immediate attention.

Below, we summarize the most significant developments, explain the policy goals behind them, and outline practical steps employers should take to reduce risk and stay compliant.

WAGE INCREASES & COMPENSATION THRESHOLDS

Statewide and Local Minimum Wage Increases

California’s minimum wage framework continues to reflect the Legislature’s focus on cost-of-living pressures and income equity. Effective January 1, 2026, the statewide minimum wage increases to $16.90 per hour, which automatically raises the minimum annual salary required for most exempt employees to $70,304.

At the same time, many local governments—particularly in major metropolitan areas—have adopted higher minimum wages to address regional housing and living costs. Employers must comply with the highest applicable wage based on where work is performed, not where the business is based. Importantly, some of these local jurisdictions implement minimum wage increases on a midyear schedule (often July 1), rather than January 1, requiring employers to monitor local updates throughout the year.

Notable local rates include:

  • City of Los Angeles: $17.87/hour (general); $22.50/hour for hotel workers
  • Los Angeles County (unincorporated): $17.81/hour
  • Santa Monica: $17.81/hour (non-hotel); $22.50/hour (hotel)
  • West Hollywood: $20.25 (nonhotel); $20.22/hour (hotel)
  • San Francisco: $19.18/hour
  • San Diego: $17.50/hour

Why this matters: Wage errors—especially in high-cost jurisdictions—remain one of the most common sources of class and representative litigation. Even small discrepancies can quickly compound across pay periods and employees.

What employers should do:

  • Verify wage rates by employee work location
  • Reassess exempt classifications tied to salary thresholds (as well as other requirements)
  • Ensure payroll systems and budgets reflect local requirements

HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY: LOS ANGELES HOTEL WORKER ORDINANCE 

Hotel Worker Training, Wage & Notice Requirements 

After prolonged legal challenges, the City of Los Angeles’ Hotel Worker Training Ordinance is now fully in effect as of September 8, 2025. The ordinance reflects the City’s broader effort to regulate working conditions in the hospitality industry by mandating training standards, higher wages, benefit requirements, recordkeeping, and employee notices for covered hotels.

Unlike many employment laws that primarily require policy updates, this ordinance demands operational changes, particularly around training and staffing practices.

Why this matters: Enforcement is expected to be active, and noncompliance can trigger administrative penalties and litigation exposure.

What employers should do:

  • Confirm whether your property is covered
  • Implement required training and documentation
  • Review notices, postings, and record-retention protocols

EMPLOYEE NOTICES, RECORDS & CONTRACTS

Workplace “Know Your Rights” Notice (SB 294)

SB 294 reflects California’s increasing emphasis on transparency and employee awareness of workplace rights. Beginning February 1, 2026, employers must provide a standalone written notice explaining certain workplace protections, including employee rights related to immigration enforcement, to all employees annually and to new hires at the time of hire.

The law also requires employers to allow employees to designate an emergency contact and—upon request—to notify that contact if the employee is arrested or detained in specified work-related circumstances.

Why this matters: Failure to provide required notices is a common (and easily avoidable) compliance issue that can support broader claims.

What employers should do:

  • Distribute the Labor Commissioner’s updated model notice
  • Update onboarding and personnel procedures

Expanded Access to Training & Education Records (SB 513) 

SB 513 expands employee access to personnel records by requiring employers who maintain education or training records to produce them upon request, along with detailed information about providers, duration, competencies, and certifications earned.

Why this matters: Training records are increasingly used in wage-and-hour, discrimination, and misclassification disputes.

What employers should do:

  • Review how training records are stored and maintained
  • Ensure records can be produced promptly and accurately

WARN Act Notice Updates (SB 617) 

California continues to enhance employee protections during mass layoffs and relocations. SB 617 expands the content required in WARN Act notices to ensure employees receive information about public benefits, workforce coordination, and how to contact the employer. Notices must now include information about coordination with local workforce development boards, CalFresh benefits, and a functioning employer email address and telephone number.

Why this matters: Deficient WARN notices can invalidate an otherwise compliant layoff process.

What employers should do:

  • Update WARN templates before any workforce action

Restrictions on “Stay-Or-Pay” Agreements (AB 692) 

AB 692 reflects legislative concern that repayment obligations tied to termination can unlawfully restrict employee mobility. Effective January 1, 2026, most provisions requiring employees to repay training costs, sign-on bonuses, relocation payments, or other amounts because they resign or are terminated are void and unenforceable, unless they fall within a narrow statutory exception or are set forth in a separately negotiated agreement that complies with AB 692’s requirements.

Why this matters: Common arrangements—particularly training reimbursement, relocation repayment provisions, and executive compensation agreements— now carry enforceability risk if not properly structured.

What employers should do:

  • Review training, bonus, relocation, and executive agreements for repayment or clawback provisions
  • Replace, revise, or restructure noncompliant provisions, including through separate agreements

PAY EQUITY, TRANSPARENCY & DATA REPORTING 

Expanded Pay Transparency and Equal Pay Act Protections (SB 642) 

SB 642 builds on California’s aggressive pay equity framework by requiring employers to post good-faith pay ranges in job postings and by broadening the scope of the Equal Pay Act. The law also expands what counts as “wages” to include bonuses, equity, benefits, and other forms of compensation. In addition, the statute of limitations has been extended, allowing claims to reach back up to six years in certain circumstances.

Why this matters: Pay equity claims increasingly rely on total compensation—not just base salary—and documentation is critical.

What employers should do:

  • Review job postings for compliant pay ranges
  • Conduct holistic compensation audits across all pay elements

Expanded Pay Data Reporting Requirements (SB 464) 

California has strengthened enforcement of its pay data reporting regime by mandating penalties for noncompliance and requiring demographic data to be stored separately from personnel files. Beginning January 1, 2027, reporting categories will more than double.

Why this matters: Reporting errors now carry automatic penalties, and preparation time is shrinking.

What employers should do:

  • Review HRIS and data storage practices now
  • Begin planning for expanded 2027 reporting, which will first be due on May 10, 2028

EXPANDED LEAVE & WORKER PROTECTIONS 

Crime Victim & Court-Related Leave (AB 406) 

AB 406 reflects the Legislature’s continued expansion of protected leave rights. Employees may now take protected time off for a broader range of court proceedings, including those involving family members. Covered proceedings include hearings related to arrest, plea, sentencing, or post-conviction matters, and apply to a wide range of serious offenses, including violent felonies, DUI with injury, stalking, and similar crimes. The law also expands permissible uses of paid sick leave, allowing employees to use sick leave to appear in court as a witness under subpoena or court order, or to serve on a jury.

Why this matters: Leave laws are frequently implicated in retaliation and interference claims.

What employers should do:

  • Update leave policies and handbooks
  • Train managers on expanded protections

WAGE ENFORCEMENT & CLASSIFICATION RISK 

Enhanced Penalties for Unpaid Wage Judgments (SB 261) 

To deter nonpayment of wage judgments, SB 261 authorizes courts to impose civil penalties of up to three times the unpaid judgment amount, including post-judgment interest, and to award attorneys’ fees and costs if a final wage judgment remains unpaid more than 180 days after the appeal period expires, absent a showing of good cause.

Why this matters: Delayed payment can now exponentially increase liability.

What employers should do:

  • Confirm all wage judgments are promptly satisfied

Strengthened Gratuity Enforcement (SB 648) 

SB 648 empowers the Labor Commissioner to independently investigate gratuity violations, signaling increased scrutiny of tip pooling and service-charge practices.

What employers should do:

  • Audit gratuity and service-charge policies

Transportation, Trucking Amnesty & Reimbursement Rules (SB 809) 

SB 809 provides limited relief for construction trucking employers with potential past misclassification exposure, while also clarifying driver classification standards and reinforcing reimbursement obligations. The law creates an amnesty program allowing eligible construction trucking contractors to avoid penalties for prior misclassification if they enter into a settlement agreement with the Labor Commissioner by January 1, 2029, and agree to properly classify drivers going forward.

Separately, SB 809 clarifies that ownership of a vehicle alone does not establish independent contractor status and reinforces that Labor Code section 2802 requires reimbursement for the business use of personal or commercial vehicles, regardless of who owns the vehicle. These provisions apply broadly to construction and transportation employers and underscore continued scrutiny of driver classification and expense reimbursement practices.

What employers should do:

  • Review driver classification and reimbursement policies
  • Evaluate potential eligibility for the amnesty program and plan for compliant classification going forward

LABOR RELATIONS, AI & EMERGING ISSUES 

Several new laws expand state labor board authority, regulate emerging technologies, strengthen civil rights enforcement, and extend industry-specific worker protections. While some measures apply only to particular sectors, each reflects California’s continued shift toward broader regulatory oversight, expanded agency jurisdiction, and heightened enforcement risk.

Expanded Labor Relations & Collective Bargaining Authority 

AB 288 expands the jurisdiction of the California Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) to hear representation and unfair labor practice claims involving certain private sector workers if federal jurisdiction under the NLRA is repealed, limited, not enforced, or effectively ceded by the NLRB, including where a case has been pending before the NLRB for more than 12 months. The law also clarifies that the Agricultural Labor Relations Board is not required to follow NLRB precedent. AB 288 is currently the subject of a federal preemption challenge that may affect enforcement.

Separately, AB 1340 grants collective bargaining rights to Transportation Network Company (TNC) drivers, including the right to organize and engage in protected concerted activity, and assigns PERB authority over representation proceedings and new reporting requirements. Companies operating in or adjacent to the gig economy should assess whether their worker relationships fall within this framework.

Artificial Intelligence, Bias Training & Civil Rights Enforcement 

SB 53 imposes new governance and reporting obligations on developers of large “frontier” AI models operating in California. Covered entities must publish AI framework reports addressing safety and risk mitigation, report certain AI-related incidents, and maintain internal whistleblower reporting mechanisms. While not employment-specific, the law has implications for employers developing or heavily relying on advanced AI systems.

SB 303 supports the use of bias mitigation training by clarifying that an employee’s good-faith acknowledgment of bias during such training does not, by itself, constitute unlawful discrimination. The law is intended to encourage voluntary or mandatory bias training without increasing litigation risk.

SB 477 expands the California Civil Rights Department’s enforcement authority by clarifying group and class complaint procedures and extending tolling of the statute of limitations during CRD investigations, internal appeals, and written extensions. Once a right-to-sue notice issues, the complainant retains one year to file suit.

Hospitality & Contractor Compliance Updates 

AB 858 extends COVID-19 recall and reinstatement obligations through January 1, 2027 for certain hospitality, airport, event center, and commercial property service employers. Covered employers must continue offering qualified laid-off employees available positions in order of seniority.

SB 291 increases penalties for licensed contractors operating without workers’ compensation coverage, with maximum fines ranging from $10,000 to $30,000 depending on entity type and repeat violations. The law underscores the importance of maintaining continuous coverage and verifying compliance by subcontractors.

IN CLOSING 

California employment law continues to evolve rapidly, with enforcement agencies armed with greater authority and penalties. Employers who take a proactive, strategic approach—rather than a reactive one—are best positioned to manage risk.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations. 

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • Major US, UK and EU designations: US designation of Clan del Golfo as an FTO and SDGT; EU asset-freeze measures linked to gang violence in Haiti; UK Russia-regime designations of the GRU and associated foreign information manipulation networks following the Dawn Sturgess Inquiry; UK cyber-sanctions designations of China-based technology companies; US and UK sanctions targeting Rapid Support Forces leadership; PRC sanctions against selected US defence companies and executives following approval of a Taiwan arms sale.
  • Sanctions litigation and judicial developments: UK Commercial Court judgment in Beneathco DMCC v R.J. O’Brien Ltd dismissing an Iran-related payment claim and confirming application of the Ralli Bros principle; UK Commercial Court refusal in FH Holding Moscow Ltd v AO UniCredit (Russia) and UniCredit SpA to grant an anti-suit injunction in Russia-related foreclosure proceedings; PJSC VTB Bank v HM Treasury confirms OFSI’s statutory discretion to amend general licences under the UK Russia sanctions regime.
  • Cyber-related sanctions expansions: UK designations under the Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 targeting China-based entities alleged to have supported malicious cyber activity against UK public- and private-sector systems; UK Russia-regime sanctions targeting coordinated foreign information manipulation and interference involving fake news websites, social media accounts and automated bot networks.
  • Significant Russia-related developments: EU Council renewal of sectoral sanctions against Russia through 31 July 2026 by Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2648; OFAC imposition of an approximately US $7.1 million civil penalty against Gracetown, Inc. for dealings involving blocked property owned by Oleg Deripaska and related reporting failures; US Treasury extension of the deadline for permitted negotiations relating to PJSC Lukoil’s foreign assets; EU agreement on a €90 billion loan package for Ukraine.
  • Geopolitical adjustments to sanctions regimes: US lifting of sanctions on Belarusian potash exports; US delisting of Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes and related parties; UK delisting of Munir Al Qubaysi under the Iraq regime; UK de-listings and new designations under the Syria sanctions regime.
  • Regulatory and licensing updates:  OFSI amendment to the Legal Services General Licence (INT/2025/7323088); amendments to Russian travel and oil-related General Licences; issuance of a Russian oil wind-down licence; introduction of a Myanmar humanitarian General Licence.

GLOBAL SANCTIONS

BELARUS

  • On 13 December 2025, the United States lifted sanctions on Belarusian potash exports, a key source of revenue for Belarus and a critical input in global fertiliser supply chains. The decision followed the release by Belarusian authorities of 123 detainees, including political prisoners and individuals associated with opposition activity against the government of President Alexander Lukashenko.

BRAZIL

  • On 12 December 2025, the United States removed Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes, his wife, and the Lex Institute from its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, reversing sanctions imposed earlier in the year under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. The original designation had frozen any US-based property and prohibited dealings with US persons and was linked to Moraes’s role in overseeing criminal proceedings against former President Jair Bolsonaro. The delisting followed diplomatic engagement between US and Brazilian officials.

CHINA

  • On 4 and 9 December 2025, the UK Government designated Integrity Technology Group Incorporated and Sichuan Anxun Information Technology Co., Ltd. under the Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020. The entities are alleged to have supported malicious cyber activity affecting UK public-sector and private-sector IT systems, including through botnet operations and the provision of cyber-intrusion services. The designations impose asset freeze measures and prohibit UK persons from making funds or economic resources available to the listed entities.

COLOMBIA

  • On 16 December 2025, the US Department of State designated the Colombia-based Clan del Golfo as both a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity under US law. According to the State Department, Clan del Golfo is responsible for widespread violence, drug trafficking, extortion and other criminal activity that undermines civilian security and regional stability. The designation blocks Clan del Golfo’s property and interests in the United States and generally prohibits US persons from engaging in transactions with the group or its members.

HAITI

  • On 15 December 2025, the EU adopted new asset-freeze measures against three individuals and one entity connected to serious human rights abuses and gang-related violence in Haiti. The designations target persons assessed to be responsible for, or complicit in, activities contributing to widespread insecurity, including violence carried out by organised criminal groups.

IRAN

  • On 24 November 2025, the UK Commercial Court delivered its judgment in Beneathco DMCC v R.J. O’Brien Ltd. The case concerned a UAE-based entity that held approximately USD 16.5 million in a derivatives trading account with an FCA-regulated broker at the time it was designated under the US Iran sanctions regime. The claimant later sought to recover the funds by issuing amended payment instructions directing payment to an account held by a third party. The Court dismissed the claim, concluding that no valid payment demand had been made because the contractual terms required payment in US dollars, and the request for payment in a different currency was ineffective. The Court further held that the broker was entitled to rely on the Ralli Bros principle, as making payment in US dollars would have involved an act within the US and would have resulted in a breach of US sanctions.
  • On 30 December 2025, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 10 individuals and entities in Iran and Venezuela for their roles in the Iran-Venezuela weapons trade, including a Venezuelan company and its chairman that acquired Iranian-designed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and assisted in their sale and assembly in Venezuela. The action, taken under Executive Orders targeting weapons proliferation, also included Iran-based persons involved in procuring chemicals used in ballistic missile programs and thereby supporting Iran’s UAV and missile development. According to OFAC, the designations build on previous nonproliferation measures and U.N. sanctions reimposed in September 2025 and reflect US efforts to disrupt the flow of Iranian conventional weapons to Caracas, which are assessed to threaten US and allied personnel and destabilize regional security.

IRAQ

  • On 10 December 2025, the UK Government removed Munir Al Qubaysi from the UK’s Iraq sanctions regime, following his delisting from the UN sanctions list. Mr Al Qubaysi had originally been designated in 2004 in connection with his role as director of Al-Bashair Trading Company, which was reported to have operated as a major front company involved in Iraq’s arms procurement activities.

RUSSIA

  • On 24 November 2025, the UK court declined to grant anti-suit injunction in Russia-related proceedings. The UK Commercial Court has refused an application for an anti-suit injunction in FH Holding Moscow Ltd v AO UniCredit (Russia) and UniCredit SpA. The dispute arose out of a financing arrangement entered into in 2018 under which a Russian operating company borrowed funds from an Italian bank pursuant to an English law–governed facility agreement providing for arbitration in Vienna. Separate security arrangements over Russian property were governed by Russian law and subject to the jurisdiction of the Russian courts. Following the commencement of foreclosure proceedings in Moscow in March 2025, the borrower sought to restrain those proceedings on the basis that the Russian courts might require conduct that would place it in breach of EU Russia sanctions. The Court rejected the application, finding that the risk of any sanctions breach was speculative and insufficiently concrete to justify intervention. It also held that the UK’s public policy interest in supporting EU sanctions, without additional factors connecting the dispute to the English courts, did not provide a sufficient basis for granting anti-suit relief.
  • On 4 December 2025, the UK Government designated multiple individuals and entities under the Russia and Cyber sanctions regimes, including Russia’s military intelligence agency (the GRU) and associated officers. The designations followed the publication of the final report of the Dawn Sturgess Inquiry into the Salisbury poisonings, which concluded that GRU agents were responsible for the attack. The measures target those involved in cyber-attacks, disinformation, sabotage and political interference undermining UK security.
  • On 4 December 2025, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed an approximately $7.1M civil penalty on New York–based property management company Gracetown, Inc. for violations of the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations and related reporting obligations. OFAC found that, between April 2018 and May 2020, Gracetown knowingly received 24 payments on behalf of a British Virgin Islands–based entity ultimately owned by designated Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, despite having received explicit notice from OFAC that all dealings involving Deripaska and his property were prohibited. OFAC further determined that Gracetown failed to timely report blocked property for more than 45 months, including an accumulated debt owed to a Deripaska-owned entity, and classified the conduct as egregious and not voluntarily self-disclosed, underscoring enforcement risks for US service providers that continue dealings or fail to meet blocking and reporting requirements following designation.
  • On 9 December 2025, the UK Government designated seven individuals and entities under the Russia sanctions regime in connection with foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) activities. Those designated include Rybar LLC and its director Mikhail Zvinchuk, the Centre for Geopolitical Expertise and its founder Aleksandr Dugin, and several organisations linked to PRAVFOND, a Russian state-backed body. The designated parties are alleged to have been involved in coordinated efforts to undermine democratic processes through the creation of fake news websites and the use of social media and automated bot accounts to disseminate misleading narratives supportive of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
  • On 12 December 2025, the US Treasury extended the deadline for permitted negotiations relating to Lukoil’s foreign assets to 17 January 2026, postponing the previous cut-off of 13 December 2025. According to Reuters, Saudi Arabia’s Midad Energy has emerged as a leading contender in the potential acquisition process and has proposed a transaction structure involving an upfront cash payment alongside escrow arrangements, under which sale proceeds would be held in a designated escrow account pending the lifting of sanctions on Lukoil.
  • On 16 December 2025, the EU Council renewed its sectoral sanctions against Russia for a further six months, until 31 July 2026, by adopting Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/2648. The sectoral measures include restrictions on Russia’s financial, energy, defence and dual-use goods sectors, and form part of one of the EU’s six Russia-related sanctions regimes. The renewal maintains the existing framework of economic restrictions introduced in response to Russia’s actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity and reflects the EU’s continued policy of sustained sanctions pressure.
  • On 19 December 2025, the Administrative Court rejected a claim brought by PJSC VTB Bank (VTB) challenging a decision of OFSI to amend a general licence. In PJSC VTB Bank v HM Treasury, VTB argued that OFSI’s amendment of the licence was unlawful. The Court dismissed the claim, confirming that OFSI was entitled to amend the general licence in the exercise of its statutory powers. The judgment underscores the broad discretion afforded to HM Treasury and OFSI in the administration and modification of sanctions licensing arrangements under the UK’s Russia sanctions framework.

SUDAN

  • On 9 December 2025, the US Department of the Treasury’s OFAC imposed sanctions on four individuals and four entities linked to a transnational network that recruited and trained former Colombian military personnel to fight for the Sudanese paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). OFAC stated that the network provided training and support, including to child soldiers, in furtherance of RSF operations contributing to Sudan’s ongoing conflict. Subsequently, on 12 December 2025, the UK sanctioned four senior RSF commanders, including RSF Deputy Leader Abdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, for their alleged responsibility for mass killings, sexual violence and attacks on civilians, imposing asset freezes and travel bans. The UK simultaneously announced an additional £21 million in humanitarian assistance, underscoring a parallel strategy of targeted sanctions and humanitarian support in response to the crisis.
  • On 27 December 2025, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed two decrees enacting decisions of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council to align parts of Ukraine’s sanctions regime with those of the UK and to implement restrictions consistent with United Nations Security Council resolutions. Under the first decree, Ukraine imposed sanctions on eight individuals and 40 legal entities, including persons and companies linked to forced child deportations, supply of dual-use electronics and components used in Russian missile and drone production, and entities facilitating circumvention of sanctions and energy-sector support. The second decree implements sanctions in line with UN Security Council mandates concerning South Sudan, targeting eight members of the country’s military leadership for their role in prolonging conflict and committing serious abuses. These coordinated actions form part of Ukraine’s broader effort to align its sanctions measures with key international partners.

SYRIA

  • On 19 December 2025, the UK added nine new designations, consisting of 6 individuals and 3 entities, all subject to an asset freeze. This followed four de-listings under the Syria regime on 17 December 2025. All de-listings remain subject to sanctions in other jurisdictions, namely the Iran regime, the Iran (Nuclear) regime, and the Chemical Weapons regime.

TAIWAN

  • On 26 December 2025, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced sanctions on 20 US defence-related companies and 10 senior executives following Washington’s approval of a roughly US $11.1 billion arms sale to Taiwan, one of the largest packages in recent history. The sanctions freeze any assets the targeted firms and individuals hold within China and bar Chinese entities and citizens from entering into business with them. The list includes major defence contractors such as Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, L3Harris Maritime Services and Boeing’s St. Louis defence unit, as well as executives including the founder of Anduril Industries. China’s foreign ministry described the measures as a necessary response to what it called provocations that “cross the line” on the Taiwan issue, reiterating that Taiwan is a core national interest and rejecting external arms transfers to the island.

UKRAINE

  • On 19 December 2025, EU leaders agreed to provide Ukraine with a €90 billion loan package intended to cover Kyiv’s budgetary and defence needs over the next two years. The loan will be financed through joint EU borrowing backed by the EU budget, rather than by using Russian sovereign assets frozen in the EU, despite earlier proposals to do so. Member States failed to reach consensus on making immobilised Russian assets part of the financing mechanism, primarily due to legal and financial risk concerns. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the agreement, noting its significance for Ukraine’s resilience, and emphasised that Russian assets will remain immobilised.

VENEZUELA

  • On 11 December 2025, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on a group of individuals and entities connected to the Maduro government in Venezuela, including three members of President Nicolás Maduro’s family, a Panamanian businessman, six shipping companies and a number of vessels. OFAC stated that two of the family members were designated under US counter-narcotics authorities, on the basis of alleged involvement in drug trafficking activities in Venezuela. The remaining family member, together with the Panamanian businessman, the shipping companies and the vessels, were designated for their alleged role in facilitating the illicit transport of Venezuelan oil, including activities linked to the Government of Venezuela and state-owned entities such as Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA).
  • On 31 December 2025, OFAC imposed sanctions on four Venezuelan oil-sector companies and identified four associated oil tankers—Nord Star, Rosalind (also known as Lunar Tide), Della, and Valiant—as blocked property for operating in Venezuela’s oil economy and facilitating revenue flows to the Maduro government. OFAC noted that these actions form part of an intensifying campaign against Venezuela’s illicit oil trade and its “shadow fleet” of vessels used to evade sanctions and generate funds for regime activities. The designations block any US property or interests of the companies and tankers and prohibit US persons from engaging in transactions with them.

GLOBAL REGULATIONS/TOOLS UPDATE: OFSI

General Licenses 

Legal Services General Licence (INT/2025/7323088), amended 17 December 2025

OFSI’s Legal Services General Licence INT/2025/7323088 took effect on 29 October 2025, replacing the previous legal services licence and permitting UK law firms, counsel and related service providers to receive payment for legal services provided to designated persons under most UK autonomous sanctions regimes, subject to specified conditions. On 17 December 2025, the licence was amended to clarify that the definition of “legal services” expressly includes legal advice and representation in dispute resolution proceedings, correcting an omission in the original October version. The licence continues to impose financial caps, detailed reporting obligations within 14 days of payment, and six-year record-keeping requirements, and does not permit payments involving persons designated solely to comply with UN obligations.

Russia

Russian Travel General Licence (INT/2022/1839676), amended 12 December 2025

This licence permits UK persons to purchase passenger rail and air travel tickets from specified Russian transport providers, including Aeroflot, Russian Railways and their subsidiaries, for journeys originating in or within Russia, as well as certain rail routes between Armenia and Georgia. It also authorises UK financial institutions and intermediaries to process payments necessary to effect such ticket purchases. The licence remains subject to strict conditions and does not permit funds to be made available beyond what is expressly authorised, and is currently valid until 22 May 2028.

Russian Oil Exempt Projects General Licence (INT/2025/5635700), amended 17 December 2025
This licence permits continued business operations involving specified Russian oil companies and their subsidiaries, including PJSC Lukoil, Rosneft and Gazpromneft-Sakhalin, where activities relate solely to listed “Exempt Projects” such as Sakhalin-2, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, TengizChevroil, Shah Deniz and Zohr. It authorises payments, contractual performance and certain shareholder activities connected to these projects for defined periods, subject to project-specific expiry dates set out in Schedule 1. The licence reflects the UK’s approach of preserving critical international energy projects while maintaining broader Russia sanctions restrictions, and includes six-year record-keeping obligations for all parties relying on its permissions

Russian Oil Companies Wind-Down General Licence (INT/2025/8202932), effective 18 December 2025

This licence authorises non-designated persons and relevant UK institutions to wind down transactions involving specified Russian oil companies, including PJSC Russneft and PJSC Tatneft, and their subsidiaries. Permitted activity includes closing out positions and taking steps reasonably necessary to effect an orderly wind-down. The licence is time-limited, expiring on 31 January 2026, and imposes record-keeping obligations requiring parties to retain transaction records for at least six years

Myanmar

Myanmar Humanitarian Activity General Licence (INT/2025/8257372), effective 19 December 2025

This General Licence permits specified humanitarian actors to carry out activities necessary to provide humanitarian assistance and support basic human needs in Myanmar, notwithstanding otherwise applicable prohibitions under the Myanmar and Global Human Rights sanctions regimes. The licence applies to UN bodies, UK-funded organisations, participating NGOs, international organisations and their partners, and allows the provision and processing of funds, goods and services required for humanitarian operations. Funds used must not be owned or controlled by a designated person, and any relevant organisation relying on the licence must notify HM Treasury within 30 days of commencing activities in Myanmar. The licence reflects the UK’s continued use of broad humanitarian carve-outs to facilitate aid delivery while maintaining sanctions pressure on designated actors.

CONCLUSION

December’s developments highlight the continued influence of US and UK sanctions authorities in shaping the global sanctions landscape through new designations, enforcement action, judicial clarification and targeted licensing updates. Alongside EU measures and selective sanctions relief linked to diplomatic and humanitarian objectives, these actions reflect an increasingly complex and enforcement-driven compliance environment for businesses and financial institutions operating across jurisdictions. MR’s monthly sanctions update will continue to monitor these developments, providing timely insight into international sanctions measures, regulatory reforms and key enforcement trends shaping the global sanctions landscape.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations. 

In a significant procedural development in one of the largest investment arbitration enforcement efforts in history, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has declined to delay issuance of its mandate in proceedings seeking to enforce approximately $50 billion in arbitral awards against the Russian Federation.

The case arises from awards issued in favor of former shareholders of Yukos Oil Company, once Russia’s largest oil producer. Following a series of tax assessments, asset seizures, and bankruptcy proceedings widely characterized by arbitral tribunals as a state-led expropriation, Yukos was dismantled in the mid-2000s. In 2014, tribunals seated in The Hague awarded the former shareholders roughly $50 billion in damages, setting off more than a decade of enforcement litigation across multiple jurisdictions.

Against that backdrop, the D.C. Circuit expressly ordered that the Clerk issue the mandate on December 17, 2025, returning jurisdiction to the district court notwithstanding the Russian Federation’s stated intention to seek review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

What Happened

The Russian Federation asked the D.C. Circuit to stay issuance of its mandate while it pursued a petition for certiorari, arguing that Supreme Court review was warranted to address unresolved questions concerning sovereign immunity and whether U.S. courts must first determine the existence of a valid arbitration agreement.

The former Yukos shareholders opposed the request, emphasizing the extraordinary length of the proceedings and arguing that further delay would unfairly prejudice their ability to pursue related enforcement actions currently pending in other U.S. courts.

The D.C. Circuit denied the request and confirmed that the mandate would issue as scheduled, thereby restoring jurisdiction to the district court.

Why This Matters

The ruling allows district court proceedings to resume in a case that has become emblematic of the challenges associated with enforcing large investment arbitration awards against sovereign states. It marks another chapter in the long-running effort by the former Yukos shareholders to enforce the awards, and in the Russian Federation’s parallel efforts to resist enforcement in multiple jurisdictions, including the Netherlands (the primary jurisdiction), England, and the U.S.

Importantly, the decision does not resolve whether the Russian Federation ultimately enjoys sovereign immunity, nor does it determine whether the arbitral awards will be enforced. Instead, it permits the district court to proceed in accordance with the appellate court’s remand instructions, including consideration of whether the doctrine of issue preclusion limits the Russian Federation’s ability to relitigate issues already decided by courts in the primary jurisdiction.

Broader Context

The decision comes amid a broader landscape of U.S. enforcement proceedings involving arbitral awards against the Russian Federation, many of which raise similar questions concerning sovereign immunity, jurisdiction, and issue preclusion.

Public reporting has suggested that the D.C. Circuit’s refusal to delay the mandate reflects judicial reluctance to permit further procedural delay at such an advanced stage of the case, particularly given the interlocutory posture and the historically limited likelihood of Supreme Court review.

What to Watch Next

District court proceedings are expected to resume promptly once the mandate issues. The court may invite the U.S. government to weigh in on questions of issue preclusion and sovereign immunity. Any petition for Supreme Court review, if filed, would proceed in parallel and would not automatically stay proceedings at the district court level.

Given the scale of the awards and the involvement of the Russian Federation, future developments may carry significant implications for cross-border enforcement strategy and broader geopolitical considerations.

Bottom Line

While procedural in nature, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling represents a meaningful step forward in the $50 billion Yukos enforcement effort. It underscores the willingness of U.S. courts to allow cases involving sovereign defendants to move forward, even as fundamental questions of immunity and enforceability remain unresolved.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations. 

The judgment of Knowles J in Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority (RAKIA) v Republic of India [2025] EWHC 1553 (Comm) represents a rare and important successful challenge under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (the “Act”), which permits an aggrieved party to seek a full judicial review of an arbitral tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction. The decision is particularly significant in the investment treaty context, as it confirms that modern bilateral investment treaty (BIT) protections extend to investments structured indirectly through local subsidiaries or joint venture vehicles.

The Facts

RAKIA, the sovereign investment arm of the Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah, invested approximately US$42.6 million in an aluminium refinery and smelter project in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, located in a tribal forest area. The investment followed a 2007 memorandum of understanding between the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Government of Ras Al Khaimah, which contemplated the establishment of an alumina and aluminium industry in the region.

The investment was made through a joint venture company, ANRAK Aluminium Ltd (“ANRAK”), incorporated in March 2007. RAKIA initially held a minority shareholding alongside its Indian joint venture partner, Penna Cement. That shareholding was later diluted after RAKIA ceased making further capital contributions while Penna continued to invest.

A central feature of the project was the Bauxite Supply Agreement (“BSA”) between ANRAK and the state-owned Andhra Pradesh Mineral Development Corporation (“APMDC”). Although construction of the refinery was completed in 2013, political opposition to bauxite mining in tribal forest areas intensified. In 2016, the State issued Government Order G.O.M. No. 44 (“G.O.M. 44”), cancelling earlier governmental approvals underpinning the BSA and issuing instructions that ultimately led APMDC to terminate the agreement. Without access to bauxite, the project became commercially unviable and collapsed.

The BIT Claim

Article 10 of the India–UAE BIT (2013) permits investors to refer disputes to arbitration, provided the dispute relates to a “measure.” Article 1 of the BIT defines a “measure” as a binding action taken by a government that affects an investment.

RAKIA, incorporated in the UAE, commenced arbitration under the BIT seeking approximately US$273 million in damages. It alleged that India’s conduct, including the cancellation of the BSA through G.O.M. 44 and related actions, breached obligations of fair and equitable treatment, protection against expropriation, and full protection and security.

The Tribunal’s Decision

A UNCITRAL tribunal comprising Lord Hoffmann, Justice Chandramauli, and J. William Rowley KC dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction. The tribunal accepted India’s argument that the relevant governmental actions did not constitute “measures” applied to RAKIA’s investment. In its view, RAKIA’s protected investment consisted solely of its shareholding in ANRAK.

Because G.O.M. 44 and the subsequent termination instructions were formally addressed to ANRAK and APMDC, rather than to RAKIA itself, the tribunal concluded that any impact on RAKIA’s shareholding was merely indirect. On that basis, it held that the dispute fell outside the scope of the BIT and therefore outside its jurisdiction, without addressing the merits of the claims.

RAKIA challenged that jurisdictional determination before the English High Court under section 67 of the Act.

The Decision of the English Court

Knowles J rejected the tribunal’s approach. Applying Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Court emphasised that treaties must be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of their terms, read in context and in light of their object and purpose.

The Court held that G.O.M. 44 plainly constituted a “measure” within the meaning of Article 1 of the BIT. It was a binding governmental act that cancelled prior approvals essential to the BSA and set in motion formal instructions requiring APMDC to terminate the agreement. The tribunal’s conclusion that the measure did not bind anyone was, in the Court’s view, both incorrect and unduly narrow. G.O.M. 44 materially altered the legal and commercial position of the parties by triggering the termination process.

The Court further held that the tribunal erred in characterising the effect of the measure on RAKIA as merely indirect. RAKIA’s investment comprised its capital contributions, shares, and pledged shares in ANRAK. By effectively shutting down the underlying project, G.O.M. 44 and the termination correspondence targeted the very enterprise in which RAKIA had invested. While the measures were formally directed at ANRAK and APMDC, their substantive and economic impact was on RAKIA’s investment.

Knowles J rejected the tribunal’s formalistic reasoning. If accepted, that approach would discourage foreign investors from structuring investments through locally incorporated subsidiaries or joint ventures, as treaty protections would be rendered ineffective whenever governmental action was channelled through the host state’s dealings with the local entity. Such an outcome would undermine the purpose of BITs and the protections they are intended to afford.

The Court concluded that the tribunal had erred in law and exceeded its jurisdictional limits. The award was set aside under section 67 and the dispute was remitted to the tribunal for determination on the merits.

Comment

The judgment underscores that BITs must be interpreted by reference to economic reality rather than narrow formalism. It provides reassurance to investors who structure their investments through joint ventures or subsidiaries, confirming that treaty protection is not lost simply because the host state’s measures are formally directed at the local operating company.

Although successful section 67 challenges remain rare, the decision illustrates that English courts will intervene where tribunals adopt an overly restrictive approach to jurisdiction that risks hollowing out the substantive protections promised by investment treaties.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations. 

In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of India clarified several important aspects of legal privilege as it applies to both external and in-house counsel. Given the Court’s findings regarding the status of in-house lawyers, companies, especially those from common-law jurisdictions where privilege for in-house counsel is well established, should reassess how they protect their interests in India.

The Case: In Re: Summoning Advocates

Concerned about police and investigative agencies summoning lawyers and demanding client information, the Supreme Court of India initiated Suo Motu Writ (Criminal) No. 2 of 2025In Re: Summoning Advocates Who Give Legal Opinion or Represent Parties During Investigation of Cases and Related Issues. The Court issued its decision on 31 October 2025.

At issue was whether communications with lawyers are protected from discovery under Section 132 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (“BSA”). Section 132 protects as privileged professional communications between a client and an advocate (i.e, a practising lawyer enrolled with an Indian Bar Council). Advocates are generally prohibited from disclosing such communications, subject to narrow exceptions; for example, where legal advice is sought for an unlawful purpose.

The Supreme Court held that investigative agencies cannot ordinarily summon advocates merely because they advised or represented an accused given the privileged nature of such communications, unless one of the statutory exceptions under Section 132 applies.

The In-House Counsel Twist

While interpreting Section 132, the Supreme Court directly addressed whether privilege extends to communications with in-house lawyers. The Court held:

  • Full-time, salaried in-house counsel employed by companies are not “advocates practising in courts” for purposes of Section 132 of the BSA. They are not considered independent from the company itself.
  • As a result, communications with in-house lawyers do not benefit from statutory advocate-client privilege.

Accordingly, legal advice provided by in-house counsel does not attract privilege in India. However, under section 134 of the BSA, confidential communications with legal advisers (including in-house counsel) are protected in a limited manner such that no individual can be compelled to disclose this information, unless the person is a witness and the disclosure of confidences appears necessary to the court to explain some part of the evidence.  

What Companies Should Do Now

If you are a multinational with operations in India, or an investor planning to enter the Indian market, this ruling has material implications. Key considerations include:

  • Recognizing that communications with in-house counsel that would be privileged in your home jurisdiction will not be privileged in India.
  • Engaging Indian external counsel early when dealing with issues that may require privilege protections.
  • Establishing policies and protocols to ensure privilege is properly invoked for high-risk or sensitive matters; for instance, involving external counsel at the outset of internal investigations and clearly marking documents created for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.
  • If you outsource or offshore negotiation or execution functions to India, particularly where Indian lawyers negotiate foreign law-governed contracts, assessing whether communications in respect of such negotiations will be disclosable in litigations or arbitrations outside India.

Conclusion

For businesses operating in India, this decision is significant and may raise concern. That being said, with informed planning, sound protocols, and thoughtful use of external counsel, companies can mitigate the risks arising from the Supreme Court of India’s clarification of privilege. Whether your operations in India are substantial or you rely on outsourced or off-shored functions, now is the time to implement practical strategies to protect your legal interests.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations. 

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • Major U.S. and U.N. designations: New U.S. sanctions on Colombia’s president and senior officials; joint U.S.–U.N. designations targeting Haitian gang leaders; U.S. designation of Venezuela’s “Cartel de los Soles” as an FTO; Nigeria designated a “country of particular concern.”
  • High-value sanctions litigation: Mikhail Fridman initiated US$16bn investment treaty arbitration against Luxembourg challenging EU sanctions-related asset freezes.
  • Cyber-related sanctions expansions: Coordinated U.S.–UK–Australia designations against Russian “bulletproof hosting” providers (including Media Land, ML.Cloud, Aeza Group); U.S. designations targeting North Korean crypto-laundering and DPRK IT worker networks.
  • Significant Russia-related developments: UK action against a billion-dollar Russian money-laundering network; U.S. measures prompting Lukoil’s accelerated sale of international assets.
  • Geopolitical adjustments to various sanctions regimes: U.S. one-year sanctions waiver for Hungary’s Russian energy imports; U.N. vote lifting sanctions on Syria’s interim leadership; U.S. removal of 2022 sanctions on Milorad Dodik.
  • Regulatory and licensing updates: OFSI and OFAC issued multiple Russia-related General Licences, including those covering Lukoil entities, CPC-related operations, correspondent-banking payments, and divestment mechanisms.
  • U.S. and UK enforcement activity: OFAC imposed a record US$4.7m penalty for dealings in blocked Russian property; HMRC published a £1.1m compound settlement for Russia-linked export breaches.

GLOBAL SANCTIONS

COLOMBIA

  • On 29 October 2025, the U.S. imposed sweeping sanctions on Colombian President Gustavo Petro, his wife Veronica Alcocer, his son Nicolás Petro, and Interior Minister Armando Benedetti. Treasury alleges the administration has “allowed drug cartels to flourish” and obstructed counter-narcotics efforts. The designations freeze U.S.-linked assets and bar U.S. persons from dealings with the listed individuals. This marks the first time the U.S. has sanctioned a sitting Colombian president and comes as the Administration expands its regional counterdrug campaign, including increased maritime interdictions and the deployment of an aircraft carrier to the eastern Pacific.

HAITI

  • On 17 October 2025, the U.S. and U.N. jointly sanctioned Dimitri Herard (former head of presidential security) and Kempes Sanon (leader of the Bel Air gang) for supporting the Viv Ansanm coalition, now considered Haiti’s most powerful gang alliance. Herard allegedly provided training and weapons to gang leaders after escaping custody in 2024, while Sanon is accused of extortion, kidnappings, and maintaining networks inside Haitian government institutions enabling him to evade arrest. The U.N. resolution imposes a global asset freeze, travel ban, and an arms embargo, marking one of the most comprehensive multilateral actions targeting Haiti’s gang networks to date.

HUNGARY

  • Following a meeting in Washington, the U.S. granted Hungary a one-year exemption from sanctions targeting Russian energy imports. The waiver allows continued deliveries through the TurkStream gas pipeline and the Druzhba oil pipeline, both of which remain central to Hungary’s energy security. As part of the agreement, Hungary committed to purchasing approximately $600 million in U.S. LNG, expanding cooperation on nuclear energy, and increasing procurement of U.S.-made nuclear fuel for the Paks nuclear power plant. The move underscores occasional U.S. flexibility in applying Russia-related sanctions where allies face acute energy vulnerabilities.

LUXEMBOURG

  • Senior Advocate Gourab Banerji has been appointed as the claimant-nominated arbitrator in a US$16 billion UNCITRAL investment treaty arbitration brought by Russian businessman Mikhail Fridman against the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The claim is brought under the 1989 Russia–Belgium/Luxembourg Bilateral Investment Treaty and challenges Luxembourg’s freezing of Fridman’s assets following his designation under the EU sanctions regime. The tribunal is now fully constituted, chaired by Professor Joongi Kim (Yonsei Law School). Luxembourg has appointed Klaus Sachs (CMS Munich) as its arbitrator. Fridman alleges that the sanctions resulted in the unlawful expropriation of his beneficial interests in ABH Holdings, part of the Alfa Group, and argues that the EU’s assertions regarding his links to the Russian government lack evidentiary basis. The arbitration follows an April 2024 EU General Court ruling that annulled earlier sanctions imposed on Fridman (Feb 2022–Mar 2023) as unjustified, though later EU listings remain in force, continuing to affect his assets.

NIGERIA

  • In early November 2025, the Administration designated Nigeria a “country of particular concern” under the International Religious Freedom Act, citing the alleged persecution of Christians and threats from radical armed groups. While this designation does not itself impose sanctions, it authorizes the U.S. to enact penalties such as the suspension of non-humanitarian aid, visa restrictions, and trade measures. Nigeria strongly rejected the allegations, noting that extremist violence in the north affects multiple communities and that the U.S. assessment does not reflect current security dynamics.

NORTH KOREA

  • On 4 November 2025, the U.S. sanctioned eight individuals and two firms implicated in laundering cryptocurrency stolen by North Korean state-sponsored hackers. According to Treasury, DPRK cyber operations have diverted over $3 billion in digital assets over the past three years, funneling proceeds into the regime’s nuclear weapons program. The designations target overseas banking representatives operating in China, Russia, and elsewhere, as well as entities managing millions in crypto for sanctioned institutions such as First Credit Bank. The action follows earlier U.S. warnings about North Korean IT workers posing as remote contractors to gain access to U.S. financial systems.
  • On 19 November 2025, the listing of Chosun Expo, a North Korean front company associated with the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), was amended under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The entity is linked to malicious cyber activity including data interference and unauthorised access to information systems.

RUSSIA

  • On 19 November 2025, the UK updated its sanctions list under the Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, adding Media Land LLC, ML.Cloud LLC, and individuals Alexander Alexandrovich Volosovik, Kirill Andreevich Zatolokin, Yulia Vladimirovna Pankova, and Andrei Valerevich Kozlov. The listings impose asset freezes and director disqualifications on the entities, and travel bans on the individuals. The UK government stated that Media Land has acted as a “bulletproof hosting” provider, supplying resilient server infrastructure that allegedly enabled ransomware operations, phishing, DDoS attacks, and other malicious cyber activities targeting organisations in the UK and allied countries.
  • In a coordinated action the same day, the U.S. and Australia also imposed sanctions targeting the same cybercrime infrastructure. OFAC designated Media Land for supporting ransomware operations, along with three members of its leadership, three affiliated companies (including ML.Cloud), and Hypercore Ltd., described as a front company for Aeza Group LLC, another bulletproof hosting provider sanctioned earlier in the year. John K. Hurley, U.S. Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, said the joint action underscores a “collective commitment to combatting cybercrime and protecting our citizens.”
  • On 19 November 2025, the UK Government added Aeza Group LLC to the UK Sanctions List under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. According to the Government, Aeza Group has provided “bulletproof hosting” infrastructure used to support the operations of the Social Design Agency, a Russian state-linked disinformation organisation already designated by the UK in 2024 for activities aimed at destabilising Ukraine and undermining democratic institutions globally.
  • On 21 November 2025, the National Crime Agency uncovered a billion-dollar Russian money-laundering network operating across at least 28 UK towns and cities, in an investigation dubbed “Operation Destabilise”. The network converted criminal proceeds and cash into cryptocurrency to facilitate sanctions evasion and Russian military financing. Key actors from the SMART and TGR networks were sanctioned by OFAC in December 2024 after being linked to the acquisition of Kyrgyzstan’s Keremet Bank, which was used to facilitate payments to Russia’s state-owned Promsvyazbank. Russian-Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor and his sanctioned platform A7 were also tied to the scheme. Operation Destabilise has resulted in 128 arrests and the seizure of over £25 million in the UK, plus $24 million and €2.6 million internationally, significantly restricting Russian-linked laundering networks’ access to Western financial systems.
  • On 21 November 2025, following the full implementation of new U.S. sanctions, Lukoil accelerated plans to divest its US$22 billion international portfolio, centred on its 75% stake in Iraq’s West Qurna-2 oilfield. A proposed sale to Gunvor had already collapsed after a 6 November U.S. Treasury statement that the company would “never get a licence” while the conflict continues. The U.S. has now authorised Lukoil to engage alternative bidders until 13 December 2025, with Chevron, ExxonMobil, ADNOC and private-equity firms reportedly evaluating offers. On the same day, Lukoil dissolved the supervisory board of Lukoil International GmbH, leaving managing director Alexander Matytsyn as sole executive. Its trading arm has reduced staff and wound down activity, and Iraq has frozen Lukoil’s revenue share from West Qurna-2.

SERBIA

  • On 29 October 2025, the U.S. lifted sanctions previously imposed (in 2022) on Milorad Dodik, the former president of Republika Srpska, along with related designations on his family members and a media outlet. The original measures had alleged corruption and efforts to destabilise Bosnia’s post-Dayton political structure. Treasury did not specify its rationale for the reversal, while Dodik publicly called the decision a “moral vindication.”

SYRIA

  • On 6 November 2025, the U.S. secured near-unanimous support at the U.N. Security Council to lift sanctions on Syria’s interim president Ahmad al-Sharaa and Interior Minister Anas Hasan Khattab. The timing aligned with al-Sharaa’s 10 November visit to Washington, the first by a Syrian president since 1946. The U.S. framed the vote as recognizing Syria’s “new era” following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. Importantly, U.S. domestic sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (2019) remain fully in effect and require congressional action for repeal.

VENEZUELA

  • On 24 November 2025, the U.S. designated the Venezuelan network known as the Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, characterising the loosely structured group of senior military, intelligence and political figures as engaged in terrorism and narcotrafficking activities that threaten U.S. national security. The designation triggers an asset freeze over any U.S.-linked property, prohibits entry into the United States, bars U.S. persons from dealings with the group, and exposes any actor providing “material support” to potential criminal liability. The move follows long-standing U.S. allegations that Nicolás Maduro and senior officials have used narcotics trafficking to consolidate power and destabilise the region, while Venezuela rejects the network’s existence and calls the designation politically motivated

GLOBAL REGULATIONS/TOOLS UPDATE: OFSI

OFSI UPDATES GUIDANCE ON DIVESTMENT LICENCES INVOLVING RUSSIAN INVESTORS

  • On 18 November 2025, OFSI updated its general financial sanctions guidance to clarify the circumstances under which it may issue a divestment licence where a Russian divest investor is involved. Under the updated framework, a UK applicant may acquire an interest in a UK entity that is currently held by a designated person or by the Russian Government provided that the full consideration for the transaction consists solely of a transfer of funds to the designated person or the Russian Government, and additional conditions specified by OFSI are satisfied (e.g., transparency, valuation, reporting). Further guidance can be found here.

CORRESPONDENT BANKING – 2022 BLOCKED PAYMENTS

  • On 5 November 2025, OFSI amended and extended the Correspondent Banking – 2022 Blocked Payments General Licence INT/2024/5394840, which permits UK financial institutions to process certain payments originally blocked in 2022 due to the involvement of Russian-designated banks in the payment chain. The update extends the licence’s validity to 7 November 2027 and introduces strengthened reporting obligations, requiring institutions to submit monthly returns to HM Treasury detailing any payments processed under the licence, including amounts, counterparties, payment routes and dates. The amendment also refines the definition of “Designated Credit or Financial Institution,” reinforcing the need for careful screening and documentation when assessing eligibility. For institutions with exposure to Russia-linked correspondent flows, the revised licence provides a continued legal mechanism to resolve legacy blocked payments, but raises the compliance bar through enhanced monitoring and reporting requirements. Further guidance can be found here.

CONTINUATION OF BUSINESS LUKOIL BULGARIA ENTITIES

  • On 14 November 2025, OFSI issued a new Russia-related General Licence INT/2025/7895596, permitting the continued operation of specified Lukoil Bulgaria entities, framed as a transitional measure to safeguard regional energy stability. While narrow in scope, this GL is operationally important: it reflects the UK’s continued use of targeted flexibility within the Russia regime, ensuring that sanctions do not unintentionally disrupt European energy markets. It also has practical compliance implications for UK businesses more broadly, particularly banks, insurers, logistics providers and legal advisors, whose screening tools may flag Lukoil Bulgaria as a Russia-linked counterparty. The licence applies to acts otherwise prohibited by the Russia Regulations. This general licence is set to expire on 14 February 2026. Further guidance can be found here.

CONTINUATION OF BUSINESS LUKOIL INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES

  • On 27 November 2025, OFSI published General Licence INT/2025/8031092 under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The licence authorises the continuation of business operations with Lukoil International GmbH (the Vienna-based international arm of Lukoil) and its subsidiaries, activity that would otherwise be prohibited under the Russia sanctions regime.  Alongside the licence, OFSI published FAQ 174, confirming that it is aware of ongoing negotiations relating to the potential sale of PJSC Lukoil’s international assets. The General Licence is valid until 26 February 2026, after which OFSI will consider renewal in light of the progress of those negotiations. Further guidance can be found here.

DESIGNATION OF NEW IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY (NEW IRA) AND SUSPECTED TERROR FACILITATOR

  • On 6 November 2025, OFSI issued an asset freeze against the New Irish Republican Army and an asset freeze and director disqualification against Kieran Gallagher under the Counter-Terrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. This matches the UK’s dedication to stop terrorist financing. Lucy Rigby MP KC, Economic Secretary to the Treasury said this in relation to the sanctions:
  • These designations reflect this government’s continued commitment to protecting the peaceful consensus of the people of Northern Ireland, and to upholding the principles of the Good Friday Agreement in support of the UK’s wider efforts to protect national security for all citizens.” Further guidance can be found here.

GLOBAL REGULATIONS/TOOLS UPDATE: OFAC

OFAC PUBLISHES NEW RUSSIA-RELATED GENERAL LICENSES FOR CPC OPERATIONS, LUKOIL ENTITIES, AND DIVESTMENT ACTIVITIES

  • On 14 November 2025, OFAC issued a package of Russia-related general licenses providing narrowly scoped authorisations for otherwise prohibited activities. General License 124B renews and expands authorisations for certain petroleum-related services connected to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), Tengizchevroil, and Karachaganak Petroleum Operating projects, ensuring continued operational and safety-critical activities. General License 128A authorises limited transactions involving Lukoil-branded retail service stations located outside the Russian Federation, including routine operations and maintenance. General License 130 permits specific transactions involving designated Lukoil Bulgaria entities to support continuity of fuel supply and essential operations. General License 131 authorises transactions necessary to negotiate and enter into contingent contracts for the divestment of Lukoil International GmbH, as well as activities required for the maintenance and orderly wind-down of the company and its subsidiaries. These measures, published at [here], form part of OFAC’s targeted approach to preserving energy market stability while maintaining core Russia sanctions restriction. Further guidance can be found here

U.S. TREASURY IMPOSES $4.7 MILLION PENALTY AGAINST REAL ESTATE INVESTOR FOR DEALINGS IN BLOCKED RUSSIAN PROPERTY

  • On 24 November 2025, OFAC announced a $4.7 million civil penalty against a U.S. real-estate investor who, through an Atlanta-based investment company, willfully mortgaged, renovated, and sold a residential property owned by a Russia-designated individual. OFAC found that the investor proceeded despite clear notice that the property was blocked, including a cease-and-desist letter and a subpoena, resulting in what OFAC characterised as an egregious violation of U.S. sanctions. Treasury highlighted that this is the largest sanctions penalty imposed on an individual to date, underscoring that U.S. persons, including real-estate professionals and private investors, must ensure strict compliance when dealing with property potentially linked to sanctioned parties. Further guidance can be found here.

RECENT CASE STUDY BY HMRC

  • On 3 November 2025, HMRC published a case study detailing a £1.1 million compound settlement paid by a UK exporter for making goods available to Russia in breach of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The case underscores the risks of exporting to third countries where goods may ultimately reach Russia and highlights the importance of understanding when an activity is considered “connected with Russia.” HMRC also clarified the scope of the “making available” prohibitions, reminding firms that sanctions liability can arise even without direct exports to Russia if goods are supplied to Russian-owned or Russia-linked counterparties. Further guidance can be found here.

IN CLOSING

MR’s monthly sanctions update will continue to monitor these developments, providing timely insight into new designations, regulatory reforms, and key enforcement trends shaping the global compliance landscape.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.