///Monthly Sanctions Update | October 2026
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
·  Russia sanctions: The UK announced further sanctions targeting Russian oil producers, shadow-fleet vessels, financial intermediaries and military supply networks. The EU adopted its largest-ever package of individual and entity listings, targeting almost 1,600 participants in Russia’s military-industrial complex.
·  Iran sanctions: The US expanded Operation Economic Outcast, targeting offshore financial institutions, Russian-linked shadow-banking networks and maritime facilitators involved in enabling Iran to circumvent international sanctions.
·  US enforcement: OFAC announced significant settlements with Bank of America and Extreme Networks, highlighting failures in sanctions screening, transaction monitoring and the identification of entities blocked under OFAC’s 50 Percent Rule.
·  UK legislation: The Global Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Sanctions Regulations 2026 came into force, expanding the UK’s autonomous sanctions framework to cover serious violations of international humanitarian law and the obstruction of humanitarian assistance.
·  Sanctions litigation: The EU Courts delivered judgments concerning individual sanctions listings, aviation restrictions and the indirect provision of funds to designated persons. The UK Court of Appeal also considered the interaction between financial sanctions licensing and insolvency law.
·  General licences: OFSI introduced new authorisations covering leasehold property payments and legal services, while OFAC issued general licences concerning Russian-origin diesel and transactions involving the International Criminal Court.
GLOBAL SANCTIONS
Iran
·  On 1 October 2026, the US Department of the Treasury announced coordinated action against the A7 Network, a Russian-linked shadow-banking network used by Iran and other sanctioned actors to circumvent financial restrictions. OFAC designated the network as a significant transnational criminal organisation, while the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposed a rule prohibiting certain transfers of funds involving its sub-agent companies. According to Treasury, the network operates through companies in third-country jurisdictions which disguise transactions connected to sanctioned persons and sectors as legitimate commercial payments. FinCEN’s proposed measure was intended to restrict the network’s access to the US financial system.
·  On 15 October 2026, OFAC announced additional sanctions targeting Iran’s international financial networks, designating 16 individuals and 10 entities, including offshore banks, financial intermediaries and Iraq’s International Development Bank. The measures formed part of Operation Economic Outcast and were intended to restrict Iran’s access to US dollars and international banking facilities. Treasury described the use of offshore corporate structures, intermediaries and foreign-exchange arrangements to move funds on behalf of Iranian interests. In a coordinated action, the US Department of State also designated Cuba-based Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA), which had provided services to a previously sanctioned Iranian bank.
·  On 21 October 2026, the US Department of the Treasury announced further sanctions under Operation Economic Outcast targeting legal and maritime service providers involved in Iran’s shadow-fleet operations. OFAC designated Karnakis and Karnakis, a law firm operating in Panama and Greece, for its role in establishing and administering corporate structures used to support the transportation of Iranian commodities. The measures also targeted five associated individuals, maritime operator Roxette Maritime and two shipping agents involved in concealing the ownership and operation of vessels transporting Iranian petroleum and other commodities. Nine vessels were identified as blocked property. Treasury stated that the network had enabled Iran to generate revenue notwithstanding existing restrictions on its petroleum sector.
Russia
·  On 1 October 2026, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) announced 31 further sanctions measures against Russia, comprising 23 individuals and entities and eight vessels. The measures targeted Russia’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) shadow fleet, pro-Kremlin disinformation networks and individuals implicated in abuses against Ukrainian civilians and children in Russian-occupied territories. The designations included individuals linked to the arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment of Ukrainian civilians, the indoctrination and militarisation of Ukrainian children, and pro-Kremlin disinformation activities. The eight vessels included ships associated with Russia’s LNG exports and related maritime operations. The individuals and entities were made subject to applicable financial and other sanctions measures, while the vessels were subjected to shipping restrictions.
·  On 8 October 2026, the UK announced a further package of 38 sanctions designations targeting Russia’s energy sector, shadow fleet, financial networks and military supply chains. The measures included the designation of Russian oil companies Zarubezhneft JSC and JSC INK-Capital, as well as 12 vessels associated with transporting Russian oil. The package also targeted financial and payment-service providers involved in facilitating transactions for Russian interests, including cryptocurrency-related businesses, together with suppliers of goods used by Russia’s defence industry. Following Zarubezhneft’s designation, OFSI issued General Licence INT/2026/11080040, permitting certain wind-down and divestment transactions involving the company and entities it owns or controls. The licence expires on 21 November 2026, subject to its terms and conditions.
·  On 12 October 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted its largest single package of sanctions listings since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The measures targeted 1,569 individuals and entities connected to Russia’s military-industrial complex, comprising 826 Russian companies and 743 company executives. The Council stated that the package focused particularly on suppliers supporting the production of Russian military equipment, including ballistic missiles. The measures increased the total number of listings under the EU’s Ukraine territorial-integrity sanctions regime to approximately 4,600. Those listed are subject to asset freezes and restrictions on the availability of funds and economic resources, with individuals also subject to travel restrictions.
·  On 15 October 2026, the Council of the EU adopted further sanctions against three individuals and nine entities involved in circumventing EU restrictions on trade with Russia, oil-related transactions and financial services. The designations included logistics and customs intermediaries involved in the importation of restricted goods into Russia, together with payment facilitators and businesses operating through international commercial networks.
·  On 16 October 2026, President Trump signed Executive Order 14436 implementing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026. The Order addressed the Act’s additional sanctions requirements and tariff measures, including duties of up to 500% on certain imports from Russia and 100% on imports from specified countries purchasing Russian-origin energy or facilitating sanctions evasion. However, President Trump exercised statutory waiver powers in respect of substantially all the new measures, limiting their immediate application. The Order did not repeal or otherwise displace existing sanctions restrictions imposed under earlier executive authorities.
Sudan
·  On 26 October 2026, the UK announced sanctions against 15 senior commanders from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), in response to suspected atrocities committed during the conflict, including conflict-related sexual violence and abuses associated with the fall of El Fasher. The designations impose asset freezes and travel bans on the individuals concerned. The FCDO identified commanders suspected of involvement in attacks against civilians and referred to investigations documenting sexual violence and other serious abuses. Alongside the sanctions, the Government announced further assistance for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and additional humanitarian support.
CASE LAW / CASE STUDIES
Court Judgments
·  On 7 October 2026, the General Court of the European Union delivered judgment in Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Boguslayev v Council of the European Union (Case T-807/25), concerning the continued inclusion of the former Motor Sich executive on the EU’s Russia sanctions list. The proceedings concerned the Council’s evidential basis for maintaining the listing following earlier challenges. The Court annulled the contested measures but rejected the associated claim for damages.
·  On 8 October 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered judgment in Global 8 Airlines v European Commission (Case C-482/24 P), concerning the application of EU aviation restrictions imposed in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The dispute concerned the inclusion of aircraft on an EU flight-ban list communicated by the European Commission. The Court held that the relevant Commission decision was capable of judicial review and referred the case back to the General Court.
·  On 15 October 2026, the Court of Justice delivered judgment in DNO Yemen AS v Petrolin Trading Limited and Others (Case C-842/24), concerning the interpretation of EU restrictions on indirectly making funds available to designated persons under the Yemen sanctions regime. The Court considered whether payments to non-designated Yemeni public authorities could infringe the prohibition where designated persons exercised influence over those authorities. It held that the existence of competing influence did not automatically establish control by a designated person. However, the prohibition may apply where the circumstances demonstrate a reasonable risk that the designated person will benefit from all or part of the funds.
·  On 30 October 2026, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales delivered judgment in PJSC VTB Bank v HM Treasury [2026] EWCA Civ 1373, dismissing VTB Bank’s challenge concerning amendments to an OFSI licence governing the administration of its UK subsidiary, VTB Capital plc. The case examined the relationship between sanctions licensing and the rights and duties arising under insolvency law. The Court confirmed that a sanctions licence authorises conduct that would otherwise be prohibited by sanctions legislation but does not alter the underlying legal rights of creditors or displace applicable insolvency requirements. The Court also considered arrangements for reserving funds in respect of claims made by sanctioned creditors.
Enforcement
·  On 9 October 2026, OFAC announced that freight forwarder Pegasus Worldwide Logistics had agreed to pay $175,015 to resolve potential civil liability arising from sanctions breaches and reporting failures. The company had helped import machinery supplied by a sanctioned business and subsequently spent six months failing to provide a complete response to an OFAC subpoena. The settlement covered four apparent breaches of US counter-narcotics sanctions and six apparent breaches of reporting requirements. OFAC classified the conduct as non-egregious, but it had not been voluntarily self-disclosed. The case highlights the importance of checking suppliers’ sanctions status when arranging shipments and responding fully and promptly to regulatory enquiries.
·  On 13 October 2026, OFAC announced an $11,662,930 settlement with Bank of America, N.A. in respect of 475 apparent violations of US sanctions programmes concerning Russia, Belarus, Iran, Burma, Somalia, narcotics and global terrorism. The apparent violations arose from several sanctions compliance deficiencies, including the processing of payments involving blocked banks, inadequate prioritisation of customer screening alerts, delays in updating sanctions watchlists and human errors affecting accounts associated with blocked persons. OFAC determined that the apparent violations were non-egregious but largely not voluntarily self-disclosed.
·  On 27 October 2026, OFAC announced a $1,529,685 settlement with Extreme Networks, Inc., a US-based networking technology company, concerning nine apparent violations of the Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions programme. The matter concerned the export of networking equipment and related services to JSC Moskovskiy Mashinostroitelniy Zavod Avangard, a Russian defence manufacturer majority-owned by the designated entity JSC Concern Almaz Antey. Although the customer was not separately identified on OFAC’s sanctions list, it was blocked under OFAC’s 50 Percent Rule. OFAC determined that the violations were egregious but voluntarily self-disclosed.
GLOBAL REGULATIONS / TOOLS
General Licences
·  On 9 October 2026, OFAC issued Russia-related General Licence 135, authorising specified transactions involving the sale, delivery, offloading and importation of diesel fuel of Russian Federation origin. The licence provides a limited authorisation for transactions that would otherwise be restricted under applicable US sanctions authorities, subject to its stated conditions and expiry date of 7 April 2027. It does not constitute a general removal of US restrictions on Russian-origin energy products. Parties relying on the licence must therefore ensure that their activities fall within its precise scope and that no other applicable legal prohibitions prevent the transaction.
·  Also on 9 October 2026, the US Department of State designated the International Criminal Court (ICC) as an institution under Executive Order 14203, extending measures previously imposed against individual ICC officials. Alongside the designation, OFAC issued General Licences 13 to 16, authorising specified categories of transactions intended to mitigate disruption to certain activities associated with the Court. The licences provide limited authorisations subject to their respective conditions and do not amount to a general exemption from the sanctions imposed.
·  On 12 October 2026, OFSI issued General Licence INT/2026/10050568, permitting designated persons, or individuals acting on their behalf, to make certain payments relating to leasehold property in England and Wales. The licence applies under UK autonomous sanctions regimes and authorises payments of ground rent, service charges and qualifying late payment fees into eligible UK bank accounts held by landlords, managing agents or their representatives. The authorisation is subject to the licence’s conditions and is intended to facilitate the discharge of routine property obligations that might otherwise require individual licensing approval. The licence expires on 11 October 2027.
·  On 26 October 2026, OFSI published the Legal Services General Licence INT/2026/11112108, replacing the previous legal services authorisation with effect from 29 October 2026. The new licence permits UK legal firms and UK counsel to receive payments from designated persons for qualifying legal services without obtaining an individual OFSI licence, provided the applicable conditions are satisfied. It updates the framework governing legal fees and expenses and imposes associated record-keeping and reporting requirements, including reporting within 14 days of the end of each month. The licence expires on 28 April 2027 and is of particular relevance to legal practitioners acting for sanctioned clients.
Legislation
·  On 15 October 2026, the Global Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Sanctions Regulations 2026 (SI 2026/1071) came into force, revoking and replacing the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020. The new Regulations extend the UK’s autonomous sanctions framework beyond the categories of serious human rights violations addressed by the previous regime. They introduce designation criteria covering serious violations of international humanitarian law and the obstruction of the delivery, distribution of or access to humanitarian assistance. The Regulations also provide additional designation mechanisms, including designation by description and an urgent designation procedure in prescribed circumstances.
FAQs
·  On 9 October 2026, OFSI published FAQ 205, clarifying the status of specific licences when a designated person is delisted. Where a licence concerns only the delisted person and no other relevant sanctions apply, it is no longer required. Licence holders do not need to apply for its revocation or contact OFSI about its status. Pending licence applications that cease to be necessary following delisting will also be closed. If the person or entity is subsequently relisted, previous licences will not automatically reactivate and a new application will be required.
CONCLUSION

October 2026 saw a further expansion of sanctions measures targeting Russia and Iran, with the UK and EU introducing significant new designations against Russia’s energy sector, military-industrial complex and sanctions-evasion networks. The US continued to target financial and maritime intermediaries facilitating Iranian transactions, while also implementing new Russia-related legislation subject to substantial presidential waivers.

The month also highlighted the growing importance of effective sanctions compliance controls. OFAC’s enforcement actions against Bank of America and Extreme Networks demonstrate the risks associated with inadequate screening, delayed sanctions-list updates and failures to identify blocked entities through ownership relationships. Meanwhile, judgments from the EU Courts and the UK Court of Appeal provided further clarification on the interpretation and application of sanctions measures, particularly in relation to judicial review, indirect financial benefit and insolvency proceedings.

More broadly, the introduction of new UK humanitarian-law sanctions powers and changes to general licensing arrangements reinforce the need for businesses and professional advisers to keep their sanctions procedures under review. Firms operating across multiple jurisdictions should pay particular attention to differences between UK, EU and US restrictions, the scope of available authorisations and the identification of counterparties connected to designated persons.

This newsletter is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.

///Monthly Sanctions Update | September 2026
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
· Iran licensing: OFAC and OFSI have each introduced a presumption of denial for Iran-related licence applications, and OFSI has confirmed that General Licence INT/2025/7628424 will not be renewed when it expires on 22 October 2026.
· UK enforcement: OFSI published a £4,732,830.58 monetary penalty imposed on Citibank, N.A., London Branch, and HMRC published a £7,438,840.13 compound settlement paid by Illumina Cambridge Limited, both for Russia-related breaches.
· US legislation: the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 was signed into law, introducing additional Russia sanctions and tariffs of up to 500%.
· New UK powers: the UK announced plans for new sanctions powers targeting those who support or profit from illegal Israeli settlement activity in the occupied West Bank.
· EU measures: the Council of the EU extended its Ukraine territorial-integrity sanctions until 22 September 2029 and adopted further listings concerning Russian information manipulation, the deportation of Ukrainian children and repression in Russia.
GLOBAL SANCTIONS
Iran
· On 10 September 2026, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $1,427,230 settlement with an unnamed US lawful permanent resident concerning 39 apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. Between June 2019 and July 2021, the individual provided management consulting and advisory services to Iranian companies, received Iranian-origin dividends into US bank accounts and purchased property in Iran. OFAC classified the apparent violations as egregious and noted that they had not been voluntarily self-disclosed. The release emphasises that US sanctions obligations apply to lawful permanent residents wherever they are located, and highlights the importance of prompt and full cooperation with OFAC investigations.
· Also on 10 September 2026, OFAC announced a presumption of denial for Iran-related specific licence applications, effective immediately, as part of Operation Economic Outcast. The formal policy covers activities prohibited under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations and other Iran-related authorities, and suspends the application of earlier licensing policy statements that favoured authorisation for certain activities. Specific licences may be issued only where required by law or in exceptional and urgent circumstances, such as risks to life, limb or environmental safety. Applicants should provide a written attestation demonstrating those circumstances. OFAC will assess applications individually in consultation with the US Department of State.
· On 23 September 2026, the UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) published guidance introducing an immediate presumption of denial for licence applications from Bank Sepah, Melli Bank plc, Bank Saderat, Persia International Bank and Bank Tejarat. Applications will continue to be assessed individually, but licences will be granted only where required by law or in exceptional and urgent circumstances, such as risks to life, limb or environmental safety. Any authorisation will cover only basic requirements. The guidance rules out licences permitting funds to be transferred directly or indirectly back to Iran, cash payments, or transfers between designated banks. It also confirms that General Licence INT/2025/7628424 will not be renewed when it expires on 22 October 2026. Transactions previously covered by that licence will then require authorisation under another applicable general licence or a specific licence.
Israel
· On 8 September 2026, the UK announced plans to introduce new sanctions powers targeting individuals and companies that support, facilitate or profit from illegal Israeli settlement activity in the occupied West Bank. The proposed measures include a ban on imports of goods from illegal settlements and on the advertising or promotion in the UK of land and property in those settlements. The Government also announced plans to expand the Global Human Rights sanctions regime to address serious violations of international humanitarian law, including those connected with settlement activity. Alongside these proposed changes, the UK imposed immediate sanctions under its existing powers on five individuals involved in supporting, inciting or carrying out violence against Palestinians. The announcement formed part of joint action with France and Canada to restrict trade linked to settlements.
Lebanon
· On 8 September 2026, the UK designated Al-Qard Al-Hasan (AQAH) under the Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, imposing an asset freeze and a director disqualification sanction. The Government cited reasonable grounds to suspect that the Lebanon-based organisation is associated with Hizballah and provides financial services and funds for terrorist purposes, specifically to Hizballah. The designation prohibits dealings with AQAH’s frozen funds and economic resources, and making funds or economic resources available to it or for its benefit, unless an applicable exception or OFSI licence permits the activity.
Russia
· On 2 September 2026, OFSI published details of a £4,732,830.58 monetary penalty imposed on Citibank, N.A., London Branch on 11 August 2026 for breaches of the Russia and Global Anti-Corruption sanctions regimes. The case involved 970 payments totalling approximately £19.72 million, with most breaches occurring between February and November 2022. OFSI identified shortcomings in sanctions screening, delays in reviewing and escalating alerts, and staff errors that allowed prohibited transactions to proceed. OFSI assessed the case at the highest level of its seriousness framework. The final penalty reflected a 20% discount for voluntary disclosure and cooperation and a further 20% settlement discount.
· On 8 September 2026, HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) published details of a £7,438,840.13 compound settlement paid by Illumina Cambridge Limited for breaches of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Between July 2022 and January 2023, Illumina was involved in supplying sanctioned goods between overseas companies within its corporate group for onward export to Russia and other destinations. The company voluntarily disclosed the breaches, fully cooperated with HMRC and took remedial steps, including ending all business involving Russia.
· On 18 September 2026, President Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 into law. The Act establishes additional sanctions targeting Russian officials, financial institutions, state-controlled entities and vessels supporting Russia’s activities. Its tariff provisions provide for duties of up to 500% on goods imported from Russia and up to 100% on goods from qualifying countries that purchase Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas, or that facilitate Russian oil sanctions evasion, subject to statutory conditions, exceptions and presidential waiver powers. The Act also extends the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 to 2031. The legislation sets implementation deadlines, including a 30-day deadline for specified sanctions and tariff measures.
· On 22 September 2026, the Council of the EU extended sanctions targeting individuals and entities responsible for undermining or threatening Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence for three years, until 22 September 2029. The measures cover more than 3,000 individuals and entities and include asset freezes, prohibitions on making funds or economic resources available to those listed, and travel restrictions for individuals. Following its review, the Council also declined to renew the listings of three individuals and one entity, and removed three deceased individuals from the list.
· On 24 September 2026, the Council of the EU sanctioned Xenia Fedorova, a former senior executive of RT France, under its framework targeting Russia’s destabilising activities. The Council cited her involvement in information manipulation and interference, including disseminating narratives aligned with the Russian authorities after RT’s broadcasting activities were suspended in the EU. The measures impose an asset freeze and prohibit EU citizens and companies from making funds or economic resources available to her.
· On 28 September 2026, the Council of the EU sanctioned 10 individuals and 17 entities over the unlawful deportation, forcible transfer and assimilation of Ukrainian children. Adopted under the Ukraine territorial-integrity sanctions framework, the listings include officials, children’s camps, sports centres and tourism organisations, alongside Songdowon International Children’s Camp in North Korea. Those listed are subject to asset freezes and restrictions on receiving funds or economic resources, with travel bans additionally applying to individuals.
· Also on 28 September 2026, the Council of the EU sanctioned 10 individuals under its framework addressing repression and human rights abuses in Russia. The listings target judges and prosecutors involved in excluding the opposition Yabloko party from the September State Duma elections and in proceedings against its leaders, including Lev Shlosberg, Maxim Kruglov and Nikolai Rybakov. The measures impose asset freezes and prohibit EU citizens and companies from making funds or economic resources available to those listed.
GLOBAL REGULATIONS / TOOLS
General Licences
· On 10 September 2026, OFSI updated its guidance on permitted travel expenses for sanctions licence applications. The revised guidance confirms that it covers travel by legal and other representatives where the relevant payments require an OFSI licence. Applicants must justify proposed expenditure, and previous authorisation does not guarantee that similar costs will be approved again. Where higher-class flights or hotels are booked without sufficient justification, OFSI may authorise only the equivalent permitted cost, subject to supporting evidence. An OFSI licence for travel expenses does not override an applicable travel ban.
CONCLUSION

September’s developments underline a clear direction of travel: licensing authorities in both the UK and the US are narrowing the circumstances in which Iran-related activity will be authorised, while UK enforcers continue to pursue significant penalties for screening failures and the supply of sanctioned goods. With General Licence INT/2025/7628424 due to expire on 22 October 2026, businesses relying on it should review their exposure now and, where necessary, seek alternative authorisation. More broadly, firms should ensure their screening controls, alert escalation processes and group-wide export arrangements remain robust as UK, EU and US regimes continue to expand. If you have any questions about how these developments may affect your organisation, please contact a member of our sanctions team.

This newsletter is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.

///
Monthly Sanctions Update
| August 2026
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
· Operation Economic Outcast: The US expanded sanctions against Iran across five additional economic sectors, designated nearly 60 individuals, entities and vessels, and suspended five existing authorisations.
· Continued pressure on Russia: The UK imposed 13 new designations and specified six shadow-fleet vessels, while the EU listed five figures connected with Russia’s defence and military-technology sectors.
· New Venezuela authorisations: OFAC issued two telecommunications licences and amended eight existing licences to remove US governing-law requirements while retaining specified dispute-resolution requirements.
· Cuba military-related designations: The US designated eight Cuban officials and five entities involved in foreign military cooperation and the procurement or maintenance of military equipment.
· Increased UK enforcement focus: The UK issued its first nationwide alert concerning the A7 sanctions-evasion network and announced that OFSI’s maximum monetary penalty would be doubled.
GLOBAL SANCTIONS
Cuba
· On 6 August 2026, the US Department of State designated eight Cuban officials and five Cuban state-owned or military entities under Executive Order 14404. The targets were involved in procuring and maintaining military equipment for Cuba’s armed forces and security services, including equipment obtained from Russia and China, or in facilitating Cuba’s foreign military cooperation. The designations block property within US jurisdiction and expose non-US persons to potential sanctions for certain dealings with the targets.
· On 6 August 2026, OFAC issued Cuba-related FAQ 1264 to clarify the treatment of non-US persons engaged in humanitarian trade under Executive Order 14404. OFAC stated that it does not intend to target the supply of food, agricultural commodities, medicines, or medical devices to Cuba, even where a designated person or a business at least 50% owned by a designated person is involved. Any US person involvement must remain within the requirements of the Cuba General Licence 1.
Iran
· On 7 August 2026, OFAC targeted two Iran-linked digital-asset exchanges and a related multinational corporate network allegedly used to fund the IRGC and evade sanctions. OFAC stated that the exchanges processed transactions involving previously sanctioned Iranian platforms and transferred digital assets to and from IRGC-controlled addresses. The wider network, which operated across the UAE, Georgia and Poland, allegedly used front companies and online gambling activity to disguise the source and movement of funds. The designations formed part of a broader SDN List update covering five individuals and twelve entities across Iran, the UAE, Georgia, Poland, Hong Kong and Singapore. On the same day, OFAC also amended Iran-related FAQ 1257 concerning the sanctions risks associated with Iranian digital-asset exchanges.
· On 12 August 2026, OFAC announced that it had reached a $60,764 settlement with Rice Lake Weighing Systems, Inc. and the company’s Italian subsidiary, Dini Argeo S.r.l., in relation to eight apparent violations of OFAC’s Iran sanctions regime. Between July 2019 and November 2021, the Italian subsidiary had supplied weighing equipment through the UAE with the knowledge that its ultimate destination was Iran. OFAC treated the apparent violations as voluntarily disclosed and non-egregious.
· On 24 August 2026, the US launched “Operation Economic Outcast”, substantially expanding sanctions against Iran. OFAC made five sectoral determinations covering Iran’s digital-assets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping sectors and sanctioned nearly 60 individuals, entities and vessels connected with nuclear and missile procurement, cyber operations and oil-revenue networks. OFAC also suspended five existing authorisations covering educational activities, non-commercial personal remittances, conferences, sporting exchanges and academic exchanges. General Licence BB permitted the wind-down of previously authorised transactions until 8 September 2026.
Russia
· On 6 August 2026, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband announced his first major Russia sanctions package, comprising 13 new designations and six vessel specifications. The measures targeted six Russian banks, six shadow-fleet tankers, four companies importing tantalum and niobium used in military equipment, two maritime businesses supporting Russia’s shipping operations and one individual connected with sanctions-evasion infrastructure.
· On 7 August 2026, the EU listed five senior figures in Russia’s defence and military-technology sectors for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine. The designations target individuals connected with the production of missiles, military communications systems, drone software and other military technologies. The individuals are subject to asset freezes and travel bans.
· On 17 August 2026, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said that she intended to put forward significantly wider sanctions listings against Russia in the autumn. Kallas said that, if adopted, the proposed listings would increase the total number of sanctioned Russian entities by approximately one-third. Any new listings would require the unanimous approval of all 27 EU Member States.
· On 20 August 2026, OFAC issued General Licence 131I, titled “Authorizing Certain Transactions for the Negotiation of and Entry Into Contingent Contracts for the Sale of Lukoil International GmbH and Related Maintenance Activities”. The licence replaced General Licence 131H and extended the relevant authorisations from 22 August to 19 September 2026. It permits transactions necessary to negotiate contingent contracts for the sale of Lukoil International GmbH and its majority-owned entities, as well as transactions required to maintain or wind down their operations. Completion of any sale still requires separate OFAC authorisation, and the licence does not permit funds to be transferred to persons or accounts in Russia.
· On 31 August 2026, the UK Government and NCA issued the first ever nationwide industry alert against A7, a Kremlin-backed payments network alleged to facilitate sanctions evasion through third-country financial institutions and cross-border payment structures. The network, which has also been linked to Iranian state-associated actors, claims to have processed more than $86 billion in transactions during its first year of operation. The Government also announced plans to increase the maximum monetary penalty for breaches of UK financial sanctions from 50% to 100% of the value of the breach.
Syria
· On 24 August 2026, the US provided further sanctions relief in relation to Syria. The State Department rescinded Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and revoked Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. OFAC consequently removed the organisation from the SDN List and revoked Syria General Licence 25 because transactions involving it were no longer prohibited solely on that basis. US persons may now transact with the organisation without separate OFAC authorisation, provided the transaction does not involve another blocked person or prohibited activity. This did not remove targeted sanctions against former regime figures, human-rights abusers, Captagon traffickers, terrorist organisations and other destabilising actors. OFAC simultaneously designated two former affiliates for supporting al-Qaida and Hurras al-Din. OFAC also updated FAQs 1220 to 1222 and removed FAQ 1223. The revised guidance confirms that the comprehensive Syria sanctions programme has not been in force since 1 July 2025, that US financial institutions may establish relationships with Syrian banks where no listed parties are involved, and that OFAC authorisation is not required to export food or medicine to Syria. Separate US export-control requirements may still apply.
Venezuela
· On 21 August 2026, OFAC issued General Licences 61 and 62 concerning Venezuela’s telecommunications sector. General Licence 61 authorised the provision of US goods, technology, software and services needed to install, maintain, repair, upgrade or operate telecommunications in Venezuela, including certain transactions involving the Venezuelan Government and state telecommunications providers. General Licence 62 authorised negotiations and contingent contracts for new telecommunications investment but did not authorise performance of those contracts without separate OFAC approval.
· On 27 August 2026, OFAC replaced General Licence 61 with General Licence 61A and amended seven existing licences covering oil, petrochemicals, diluents, electricity, PDVSA, gold and other minerals. The amendments removed the requirement for contracts directly with the Venezuelan Government or specified blocked entities to be governed by US law. Such contracts must still require related dispute-resolution proceedings to take place in the United States, United Kingdom, France or Singapore.
GLOBAL REGULATIONS / TOOLS
· On 3 August 2026, the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation published guidance on banknote sanctions. The guidance explains prohibitions on exporting, supplying, or making sterling or specified European banknotes available to Russia and Belarus. The guidance confirms the personal use exception of up to £10,000 per journey where the money is required for the essential needs of the traveller or accompanying immediate family. The exception does not cover commercial, investment, or professional purposes, or delivering cash to family or friends living in Russia and Belarus. The full guidance can be found here.
· On 3 August 2026, the House of Commons Library published a Research Briefing titled “Sanctions against Russia: What has changed since January 2025?”. The briefing considers the increasing divergence between US and European sanctions policy, recent UK and EU measures targeting Russia’s defence, financial, energy and shadow-fleet networks, and the continuing debate over the use of immobilised Russian state assets to support Ukraine. It also provides an overview of the wider UK and EU sanctions regimes addressing Russian cyber activity, chemical weapons, human rights abuses and hybrid threats. The full briefing can be found here.
· On 27 August 2026, OTSI published its first Annual Review, covering 1 April 2025 to 31 March 2026. OTSI received 178 reports or referrals concerning potential trade sanctions breaches, of which 156 related to Russia, and closed 104 enforcement cases, including 40 referred to HMRC. Although OTSI did not impose any civil monetary penalties during the period, it reported that a substantial number of investigations had reached an advanced stage. OTSI also received 51 licence applications, 50 under the Russia regime, and granted 17, with an average processing time of 96 working days. The full review can be found here.
General Licences
· On 12 August 2026, OFSI amended General Licence INT/2025/8031092 permitting the continuation of business operations involving Lukoil International GmbH and its subsidiaries. The amendment revised the definition of a “Lukoil International Subsidiary” and introduced the definition of an “Entity”. The amendment also introduced a new notification requirement for entities using the licence and extended its expiry date to 26 February 2027.
· On 12 August 2026, OFSI also amended General Licence INT/2025/7895596, which permits the continuation of business operations with the Lukoil Bulgaria Entities. The amendment revised the definition of the subsidiaries covered by the licence, introduced a definition of “Entity” and a new notification requirement for entities using the licence, and extended its expiry date to 29 October 2026.
Case Law
· On 29 July 2026, the UK Supreme Court refused permission to appeal to Dana Astra IOOO, a Belarus-registered construction company and one of Belarus’s largest property developers, on the basis that its application raised no arguable point of law. DANA, which has no assets or business in the UK, was designated under the UK’s Belarus sanctions regime in December 2020. The designation was based on the Secretary of State’s assessment that there were reasonable grounds to suspect DANA of involvement in the repression of civil society or democratic opposition through its sponsorship of the Belarusian National Olympic Committee, and of benefiting from or supporting the Belarusian government through its construction activities. The refusal leaves in place the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of DANA’s challenge to its designation. The decision can be found here.
Investigations
· On 27 August 2026, ENEX Premium Trading Limited agreed to forfeit more than $5.2 million, equivalent to approximately £3.84 million, following an NCA civil recovery investigation into suspected money laundering and sanctions evasion. The forfeited money was traced through ENEX’s Chinese bank accounts to payments from companies later sanctioned by the US for facilitating illicit Iranian oil sales and revenue and sending funds to the Iranian QODS Force. The NCA suspects that the forfeited funds represented the proceeds of money laundering. However, the settlement did not amount to an admission of unlawful conduct by ENEX or its owner and does not constitute evidence of criminal conduct.
CONCLUSION

August 2026 reflected a mixed but increasingly targeted approach to sanctions policy. While the US, UK and EU continued to increase pressure on Iran, Russia and Cuba, the US provided further sanctions relief in relation to Syria and expanded certain authorisations concerning Venezuela. The month also demonstrated an increased focus on sanctions enforcement and circumvention, particularly through the UK’s A7 industry alert, the proposed increase in OFSI’s maximum monetary penalties and the NCA’s recovery of funds linked to suspected sanctions evasion.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.

The first half of 2026 has produced several decisions with immediate practical implications for businesses litigating in London. The cases considered below address the management of privilege, proof of corporate fraud, historic shareholder claims, contractual termination and jurisdiction provisions, arbitral enforcement and challenges, collective proceedings, and court transparency.

Across those areas, these decisions have practical consequences for how businesses manage litigation risk. They show the importance of defining the client group for legal advice privilege purposes, controlling the circulation of confidential material, maintaining clear transaction and disclosure records, following contractual notice and pricing provisions carefully, and considering how funding, settlement, and court transparency issues may affect the conduct of proceedings. This round-up summarises some of the main developments from the year so far and draws out the points most likely to matter to boards, in-house legal teams, and disputes practitioners.

///Monthly Sanctions Update | June 2026
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
· Enforcement related to Russia: OFSI published a £1,000,920.59 penalty against Sabre Global Technologies Limited, the UK’s largest financial sanctions penalty since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and OFSI’s first penalty involving circumvention; HMRC announced a £569,157 compound settlement with Petrofac Facilities Management Limited; and OFAC announced a $1,050,000 settlement with FTI Consulting, Inc.
· Russia sanctions packages and renewals: The UK announced 70 further Russia sanctions targeting shipping actors linked to oil and LNG, military procurement networks and sanctions evasion finance organisations; the EU listed 34 individuals and 47 entities in connection with Russia’s war against Ukraine; and the EU renewed its economic sanctions against Russia until 31 July 2027.
· Other global designations: US measures targeted Cuban revenue generating entities, DRC armed group and mineral smuggling networks, digital asset exchanges linked to Iran, LPG shipping and procurement networks, and procurement and recruitment networks related to Sudan.
· Regulatory, licensing and guidance updates: OFSI issued or amended Russia related general licences concerning interdiction activity, Lukoil International and Prince Group insolvency activities; added FAQs on transferable securities, PJSC Transneft and the Lukoil General Licence; and published, with OFAC, comparative guidance on the UK and U.S. sanctions regimes.
GLOBAL SANCTIONS
Cuba
· On 23 June 2026, the US Department of State announced further sanctions targeting the Cuban regime’s revenue generation network pursuant to Executive Order 14404. The measures include the designation of five Cuban entities and one individual alleged to generate revenue for, or otherwise support, the Cuban regime. The newly designated entities comprise Almacenes Universales S.A. (AUSA), Rafin S.A., and Banco Financiero Internacional S.A., all of which are affiliated with the previously designated military controlled conglomerate Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA). The Department of State also designated Geominera S.A., a state owned mining company, and Empresa Siderúrgica José Martí, Cuba’s largest producer of raw steel. In addition, Annalie Lilliam Rueda Cardero, a member of the extended Castro family, was designated.
DRC
· On 2 June 2026, OFAC designated Gustave Kubwayo, also known as “Colonel Sirkoof”, and John Imani Nzenze under the DRC sanctions regime. Kubwayo is described by OFAC as a commander of an intelligence and special operations unit within the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, while Nzenze is described as a commander and chief of intelligence of the March 23 Movement.
· On 25 June 2026, OFAC sanctioned a Rwanda based network alleged to have worked with the Rwanda backed March 23 Movement to smuggle minerals from eastern DRC into Rwanda. The designations include Gasabo Gold Refinery LTD, Jean Malic Kalima Karekezi, Bosco Kayobotsi, Bugambira Mines LTD, Wolfram Mining and Processing LTD, and Rwinkwavu Mining Corporation LTD. OFAC stated that Gasabo acted as a key partner in sourcing and transporting gold from areas of South Kivu occupied by RDF/M23, with at least 60kg of gold allegedly moved from eastern DRC to the refinery in early 2026.
Iran
· On 2 June 2026, OFAC designated Rahkar Fanavari Nooyan, also known as Nobitex, Iran’s largest digital asset exchange, together with several other Iranian exchanges, including Khalgh Sarvat Sarzamin Parseh, also known as Wallex, Sana Ayman Mubadala, also known as Bitpin, and Ramzineh Electronic Commerce Innovation Company, also known as Ramzinex. OFAC also designated several Nobitex officials, including Amir Hossein Rad, its chairman and cofounder. OFAC stated that Nobitex processed more than half of all Iranian digital asset inflows in 2025 and facilitated transactions linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, sanctions evasion and ransomware activity.
· On 5 June 2026, OFAC designated a network alleged to have shipped Iranian origin liquefied petroleum gas to South and East Asia while disguising it as Omani origin LPG. Key targets included alleged network operators Sarbaz Abdul Zada and Mohammad Shakol Mihandoust, also known as “Haji Shakoor”, together with trading companies based in the UAE and China involved in the alleged scheme. OFAC also designated several vessel owning or operating companies and identified a number of LPG tankers as blocked property, including MD 23, GLENDALE, AMIR GAS, GAS LAGOON, MILE, and GAZ GMS. Separately, OFAC designated Mehrdad Geramian Nik and Partners Company, an Iranian exchange house alleged to have processed illicit financial transactions connected to Iranian oil revenue.
· On 10 June 2026, OFAC designated a procurement network based in China and Hong Kong alleged to have supported weapons procurement for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics. Key targets included Chinese nationals Liu Boyu, Wang Hongyi and Xu Lichun, as well as Mustad Shanghai International Trade Co Ltd and Domus Trading HK Limited. OFAC also designated a Hong Kong based company alleged to operate within Iran’s clandestine banking network. The measures were imposed under Executive Orders 13382 and 13902.
Russia
· On 1 June 2026, OFAC announced a $1,050,000 settlement with FTI Consulting, Inc. concerning apparent breaches of U.S. sanctions targeting Russia’s financial sector. The matter concerned FTI’s work for the benefit of VTB, where invoices were routed indirectly and, on six occasions between April 2019 and May 2021, either remained outstanding or were paid after the permitted 14 day payment period. OFAC treated this as indirect dealing in prohibited debt. The apparent violations were found to be not egregious and were not voluntarily disclosed.
· On 15 June 2026, the Council of the EU imposed further sanctions in connection with Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, listing 34 individuals and 47 entities. The package focuses on parties said to support Russia’s war economy, including suppliers of drones and military equipment, actors connected to the transport of Russian oil, and those involved in pro Russian influence activity. It also includes listings linked to serious human rights concerns in Russia, including matters connected with the poisoning of Alexei Navalny. The Council also decided to extend the EU’s Crimea and Sevastopol sanctions framework until 23 June 2027.
· On 16 June 2026, the UK Government announced 70 further Russia sanctions aimed at networks supporting Russia’s war effort. The package covers vessels and shipping linked actors connected to Russian oil and LNG activity, including more than 20 oil tankers and several LNG vessels linked to the Arctic LNG 2 project. It also targets a GRU linked procurement network alleged to have sought Western technology for Russia’s military, third country suppliers of military equipment, and organisations involved in moving funds in ways said to bypass sanctions.
· On 17 June 2026, OFSI published details of a £1,000,920.59 monetary penalty imposed on Sabre Global Technologies Limited (“SGTL”) for breaches of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, the UK’s largest penalty for financial sanctions breaches since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The penalty related to SGTL’s continued provision of travel technology services to Ural Airlines after its designation in May 2022, the making of funds and economic resources available to or for the benefit of a designated person, and the testing of alternative payment routes after sanctions concerns had been raised. OFSI assessed the case as “most serious”, including because SGTL actively circumvented UK financial sanctions, and applied a 20 percent discount to reflect SGTL’s voluntary disclosure and settlement under OFSI’s transitional settlement arrangements.
· On 25 June 2026, the Council of the EU renewed the EU’s economic sanctions against Russia for a further 12 months, until 31 July 2027. The measures, first introduced in 2014 and expanded significantly following Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, cover areas including trade, finance, energy and dual use technology. They also include restrictions on Russian seaborne crude oil and certain petroleum products, transaction bans affecting financial institutions and crypto service providers, and measures aimed at addressing sanctions circumvention.
· On 29 June 2026, HMRC announced that Petrofac Facilities Management Limited had paid a £569,157 compound settlement in relation to breaches of Russia sanctions regulations. The breaches took place in 2022 and 2023 while the company was winding down its Russian operations, and concerned the supply of sanctioned industrial goods to persons connected with Russia, as well as related technical assistance. PFML self reported the breaches and cooperated with HMRC’s investigation. HMRC also stated that PFML is the first company to be publicly named by HMRC after accepting a compound settlement, reflecting a new approach under which naming may be included as a condition of settlement for strategic export and sanctions offences.
Sudan
· On 26 June 2026, OFAC designated eight individuals and entities linked to procurement and recruitment networks supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. The designations include Target Multiactivities Company Ltd., SBL Energy Limited, Ports Engineering Company LTD, and individuals connected to Talent Bridge, S.A., a Panama based company linked to the recruitment of former Colombian military personnel for the RSF. The measures were imposed under Executive Order 14098, which targets persons destabilising Sudan and undermining its democratic transition.
GLOBAL REGULATIONS / TOOLS UPDATE
General Licences
· General Licence INT/2026/9559192: On 12 June 2026, OFSI issued General Licence INT/2026/9559192 under the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The licence permits persons contracted or directed by HMG to take necessary steps to enable and enact an “Interdiction”, defined as action taken to facilitate, enable or otherwise support HMG’s exercise of legal powers to enforce possible breaches of the Russia Regulations. It also permits certain related payments, including payments made for the benefit of a designated person where this is solely for the purpose of enabling and enacting the interdiction, and permits Relevant UK Institutions to process payments made in accordance with the licence. The licence took effect from 12 June 2026.
· General Licence INT/2025/8031092: On 19 June 2026, OFSI amended General Licence INT/2025/8031092, which permits certain otherwise prohibited activities to enable the continuation of business involving Lukoil International GmbH and its subsidiaries. The amendment removed the restriction previously set out in paragraph 4.2, under which certain funds to which Lukoil International or its subsidiaries were entitled were required to be paid into a frozen account. OFSI has clarified that the amendment does not permit funds to be returned to PJSC Lukoil. The licence currently expires on 25 August 2026.
· General Licence INT/2026/9491628: On 24 June 2026, OFSI amended General Licence INT/2026/9491628, which permits certain otherwise prohibited insolvency related payments and activities connected with the Prince Group and its subsidiaries. The amendment revises the definition of “Permitted Insolvency Activities” to permit the making, receiving or processing of payments, and other actions connected with insolvency proceedings, where conducted at the direction of, or with the consent of, an Insolvency Practitioner, provided that no funds or economic resources are made available to, or for the benefit of, any designated person other than a Prince Group DP or Subsidiary. The licence took effect from 14 April 2026, was amended on 24 June 2026, and expires on 13 April 2031.
FAQs
· On 8 June 2026, OFSI added FAQ 187 to its UK Financial Sanctions FAQs, addressing how the “date of issue” should be assessed for transferable securities and money market instruments under the Russia and Belarus sanctions regimes. The FAQ explains that instruments issued before the relevant dates are not prohibited from being dealt with solely on that basis, provided no other sanctions prohibitions are engaged. Where a new security or instrument is created in connection with a security issued earlier, including through a mandatory corporate action, OFSI states that the assessment will depend on the facts, with particular weight given to whether the process raises new finance for the issuer. By way of example, the FAQ indicates that a mandatory stock split may fall outside the relevant restrictions where it does not raise new finance and does not materially alter the rights or value of the shares.
· On 11 June 2026, OFSI added FAQs 188 to 195 to its UK Financial Sanctions FAQs, addressing how UK financial sanctions may apply to activities involving ports and infrastructure owned or controlled by PJSC Transneft. The FAQs indicate that a vessel’s call at a port owned or controlled by Transneft, or the use of Transneft infrastructure within a supply chain, will not by itself trigger UK financial sanctions. However, firms are expected to consider the facts of each case, including whether there is a UK nexus and whether any related insurance, port, terminal, transport, storage or other payment would result in funds or economic resources being made available to PJSC Transneft or another designated person. OFSI also confirms that compliance with EU or other sanctions regimes does not, of itself, demonstrate compliance with UK financial sanctions.
· On 24 June 2026, OFSI added FAQ 196 to its UK Financial Sanctions FAQs, explaining the purpose of the 19 June 2026 amendment to General Licence INT/2025/8031092. The FAQ states that the amendment is intended to allow Lukoil International subsidiaries to access funds needed to meet operational costs, including payments to staff, suppliers and essential services, and to support the viability of Lukoil International’s assets while sale negotiations are ongoing. The FAQ also reiterates that the General Licence does not permit funds to be made available to, or for the benefit of, PJSC Lukoil, the designated Russian parent company.
Publications
· On 18 June 2026, the House of Commons Library published a research briefing considering the domestic and international legal frameworks governing UK enforcement action against Russia’s shadow fleet, including vessels suspected of being used to evade restrictions on Russian oil exports. The briefing notes recent UK and allied enforcement action, while highlighting that enforcement is more straightforward against “stateless” vessels and that significant legal questions remain in relation to foreign flagged vessels, particularly where issues of innocent passage through territorial waters arise. The full research briefing can be found here.
· On 23 June 2026, HM Treasury and OFSI published joint guidance with OFAC titled ‘The U.S. and UK Economic Sanctions Authorities: A Comparative Overview’. The guidance compares key aspects of the US and UK sanctions regimes, including sanctions lists, licensing, reporting, recordkeeping, ownership and control, and enforcement. The guidance highlights both similarities and important differences between the regimes. In particular, it contrasts OFAC’s “50 Percent Rule” with the UK’s broader ownership and control test, and compares the approaches of OFAC and OFSI to reporting, recordkeeping and voluntary disclosures. The publication is a useful practical tool for businesses operating across both jurisdictions and reflects continued coordination between OFAC and OFSI, while making clear that the two regimes should not be treated as identical. The guidance can be found here.
CONCLUSION

June 2026 reflected continued sanctions pressure on Russia, with further UK and EU designations, renewed EU economic measures, and notable UK enforcement action. The penalties from OFSI and HMRC also show the growing importance of sanctions controls during wind down, payment, and service arrangements. The month’s licensing updates, FAQs and joint OFSI/OFAC guidance underline the need for firms to assess sanctions exposure carefully and separately across UK, US and EU regimes.

Michelman Robinson’s monthly sanctions update will continue to monitor these developments, providing timely insight into international sanctions measures, regulatory reforms and key enforcement trends shaping the global sanctions landscape.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.

Advice from a Partner Who Has Watched This Pattern Before

Every generation of new lawyers has inherited a profession in motion. I know this because I was one of them once, handed a matter that required Shepardizing, the laborious process of confirming that every case you intended to cite was still good law, by hunting through thick burgundy and gold volumes arranged on shelves. You pulled the bound Shepard’s Citations for the relevant reporter, cross-referenced your case by volume and page number, then traced a web of subsequent history through notation symbols that took months to learn fluently. It was painstaking and methodical. Then Westlaw and Lexis arrived, and that entire world disappeared.

Word processors replaced the transcription pool. Voice dictation replaced the micro-cassette recorder. E-discovery platforms replaced warehouses of bankers boxes. Each time, the worry was that something essential was being lost. Each time, what was lost was the mechanical layer, and what remained was sharper, more interesting, and more genuinely legal. The pattern is familiar. The scale is not.

Our firm made a deliberate decision to get ahead of AI early, investing substantially across both client-facing practice and internal operations. The goal was never to replace lawyers. It was to put our people in a position to move faster, serve clients better, and grow into trusted advisers sooner. What we have seen bears that out.

Artificial intelligence is the largest version of this story I have witnessed.
And if you are a new lawyer right now, you are standing at exactly the right moment.

If you are worried that losing the mechanical work means losing the training ground, I hear that. But apprenticeship has never really been defined by the mechanics of gathering information. It has always been defined by learning to evaluate it, challenge it, and turn it into advice a client can trust. AI accelerates that journey. It does not replace it.

The cite-checking, the manual document review, the regulatory cross-referencing that once consumed a first-year’s early years can now be done in a fraction of the time. Use that well. Get closer to the client, go one level deeper than the assignment asked for, and ask the question nobody else thought to put in the memo. That is where reputations get built, and all of it is available to you far earlier in your career than it was to any generation before you.

Don’t ignore the new practice area. AI and technology law is growing faster than most firms have fully reckoned with, and new lawyers are better positioned to own it than most senior partners ever will be. You understand this environment intuitively. The clients navigating data privacy, algorithmic liability, and AI governance are largely your generation. Get close to that work now, and you will find that your future clients are the people you are meeting today.

The noise right now is that this is a dangerous time to be starting out. I have heard that before, about every tool that turned out to be an opportunity. The mechanical floor of this profession is rising. What remains, judgment, relationships, and genuine counsel, is exactly what drew most of you here. That is why I believe this is the most exciting time to be a new lawyer.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.

 

///Monthly Sanctions Update — May 2026
KEY DEVELOPMENTS
· Major US, UK and EU designations: UK Russia-related sanctions targeting crypto exchanges, illicit finance networks, the A7 network, a Kyrgyz bank and Georgian exchange operators alleged to facilitate sanctions evasion; UK designations targeting Russia’s drone supply chain and alleged exploitation of vulnerable migrants; U.S. Iran-related designations targeting petroleum and petrochemical export networks.
· Sanctions litigation and enforcement developments: OFSI imposed a £165,000 penalty on Deutsche Bank AG London Branch for breaches of the UK Russia financial sanctions regime. The English High Court dismissed RUSAL’s sanctions-related public policy challenge to enforcement of a London-seated LCIA award, while the Court of Appeal in Tonzip Maritime clarified when shipowners may refuse performance based on sanctions risk.
· Regulatory and guidance updates: The FCA signed a Memorandum of Understanding with OTSI and published findings from its review of sanctions systems and controls, identifying weaknesses in due diligence, screening, alert management, frozen-asset controls and licence compliance. OFSI also added FAQ 186 on Huobi Global S.A. and HTX, while OFAC removed 76 legacy entries from the SDN List.
· General licences: OFAC issued or amended general licences across the Iran, Cuba, Russia and Venezuela regimes, including wind-down authorisations for Qingdao Haiye Oil Terminal Co., Ltd., Cuba-related authorisations preserving existing CACR permissions, Russia-related licences concerning pre-existing oil shipments and Lukoil International GmbH, and Venezuela-related licences concerning PDVSA debt and debt-restructuring advisory services.
· Trade controls and export licensing: The EU expanded its Iran sanctions framework to address conduct undermining freedom of navigation through international straits, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. The UK also reportedly introduced temporary trade licences delaying certain Russian-origin oil and LNG restrictions, and targeted third-country actors alleged to support Russia’s military supply chains or sanctions circumvention.
GLOBAL SANCTIONS
China
· On 2 May 2026, it was reported that China’s Ministry of Commerce issued a prohibition order under its Blocking Rules following recent U.S. sanctions targeting five Chinese oil refineries alleged to have purchased Iranian oil. According to reporting, the measure marked the first known use of China’s Blocking Rules since their introduction in 2021 and prohibits compliance in China with the relevant U.S. sanctions measures. The development followed OFAC action against a number of Chinese “teapot” refineries and has been viewed as a notable escalation in the use of China’s anti-sanctions framework in response to U.S. secondary sanctions.
Cuba
· On 7 May 2026, OFAC issued General License No. 1 under Executive Order 14404, authorising transactions otherwise prohibited by the new Cuba-related sanctions measures where such transactions are already authorised or exempt under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”). The general licence preserves the continued availability of existing CACR authorisations despite the introduction of Executive Order 14404, which targets persons deemed responsible for repression in Cuba and threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy. OFAC clarified, however, that the authorisation does not extend to transactions otherwise prohibited under 31 CFR Chapter V.
Iran
· On 1 May 2026, OFAC issued General License W under Executive Order 13846, authorising the wind-down of transactions involving Qingdao Haiye Oil Terminal Co., Ltd. and entities in which it has, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater ownership interest. The authorisation permits transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to wind down dealings with the designated entity through 31 May 2026, provided that any payments to blocked persons are made into blocked, interest-bearing accounts located in the United States. OFAC clarified that the licence does not authorise transactions involving other persons blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13846 unless separately authorised.
· On 22 May 2026, the Council of the European Union expanded the scope of its Iran sanctions framework to target individuals and entities involved in actions undermining freedom of navigation and the rights of transit and innocent passage through international straits, particularly the Strait of Hormuz. The amendments enable the EU to impose travel bans and asset freezes on persons linked to conduct interfering with maritime traffic, while also prohibiting EU persons and companies from making funds or economic resources available to designated parties. The measures follow growing international concern regarding Iranian actions affecting commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and build on political agreement reached by EU foreign ministers in April 2026. The Council stated that interference with vessel transit through the Strait contravenes international law and reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to maritime security and freedom of navigation in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2817 (2026).
· On 28 May 2026, OFAC announced further Iran-related designations aimed at disrupting networks supporting Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical exports. The action targeted companies, vessels and individuals alleged to have facilitated the sale, shipment or management of Iranian-origin oil and petrochemical products, including through shipping and trading structures outside Iran. The designations reflect continued U.S. efforts to restrict revenue streams connected to Iran’s energy sector and to increase sanctions exposure for intermediaries involved in Iranian oil trade.
Russia
· On 5 May 2026, the UK announced a new package of sanctions targeting Russia’s drone production networks and the alleged exploitation of vulnerable migrants in support of the war in Ukraine. The measures designate 35 individuals and entities linked to Russia’s military drone supply chain, including actors involved in procuring components from third countries and recruiting foreign nationals for deployment or labour in Russian weapons facilities. The sanctions, imposed under both the Russia sanctions regime and the UK’s Global Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Persons framework, mark the first use of the latter in response to state-backed military activity. The UK government stated that the measures are intended to disrupt Russia’s expanding drone capabilities and combat the use of coercive migrant recruitment practices connected to the conflict in Ukraine.
· On 18 May 2026, OFAC issued General License No. 134C authorising, through 17 June 2026, transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products loaded onto vessels on or before 17 April 2026, including cargo carried on blocked vessels. The authorisation extends to related maritime services such as docking, bunkering, insurance, classification, and salvage, but excludes transactions involving persons connected to Iran, North Korea, Cuba, certain occupied regions of Ukraine, or other prohibited dealings under U.S. sanctions regulations. General License 134C replaces and supersedes General License 134B in its entirety.
· On 20 May 2026, it was reported that the UK Government introduced temporary trade licences delaying the implementation of certain restrictions relating to Russian-origin oil and LNG in response to energy market disruption linked to the conflict in the Middle East. One licence permits the import of jet fuel and diesel refined from Russian crude in third countries, while another waives restrictions relating to the shipping of LNG from two Russian terminals. The Government described the measures as short-term and part of a phased implementation of tighter sanctions measures against Russia, citing concerns over fuel prices and energy supply stability.
· On 26 May 2026, the UK announced 18 new Russia-related sanctions targeting cryptocurrency exchanges and illicit finance networks alleged to have helped Russia circumvent existing sanctions. The measures focus on the Kremlin-backed A7 network, which the UK says has used Kyrgyzstan’s financial system and crypto-related channels to move funds into Russia’s war economy, including proceeds connected to oil sales and military procurement. The package also targets A7-linked individuals, a Kyrgyz bank suspected of facilitating payments for the network, a major cryptocurrency exchange, and three Georgian companies operating Russia-focused exchanges. The UK Government said the measures are intended to disrupt payment routes and shadow financial infrastructure used to sustain Russia’s war in Ukraine.
· On 28 May 2026, OFAC issued General License No. 131F, extending certain Russia-related authorisations concerning Lukoil International GmbH. The licence permits, through 27 June 2026, transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the negotiation and entry into contingent contracts for the sale, disposition or transfer of Lukoil International GmbH, as well as related maintenance activities. OFAC also amended Russia-related FAQs 1224 and 1225 to reflect the updated authorisation.
Venezuela
· On 4 May 2026, OFAC issued General License No. 5W under the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, authorising, effective 19 June 2026, transactions related to, financing for, and other dealings in the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”) 2020 8.5 Percent Bond that would otherwise be prohibited under Executive Order 13835, as amended. OFAC clarified that the authorisation does not extend to transactions otherwise prohibited under the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations or other provisions of 31 CFR Chapter V. General License 5W replaces and supersedes General License 5V in its entirety as of 4 May 2026.
· On 5 May 2026, OFAC issued General License No. 58 under the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, authorising legal, financial advisory, and consulting services to the Government of Venezuela and Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. in connection with potential debt restructuring. The authorisation covers activities ordinarily incident and necessary to assessing and preparing restructuring options, but expressly excludes the restructuring, transfer, or settlement of debt itself, as well as direct negotiations with creditors. The licence also excludes transactions involving certain jurisdictions, including Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and China, and requires parties relying on the authorisation to submit executed service contracts to the U.S. Department of State and Department of Energy within 10 business days.
Case Law
· On 1 May 2026, the English High Court dismissed an application by United Company RUSAL to set aside enforcement of a London-seated LCIA award worth approximately €214 million obtained by OWH SE in liquidation, a former European subsidiary of VTB Bank. RUSAL argued that enforcement would be contrary to English public policy because RTI, its co-defendant, reasonably believed payment obligations under the underlying ISDA transactions could breach Jersey sanctions relating to VTB Russia. The Court rejected the application, reaffirming the strong public interest in enforcing arbitral awards and concluding that the Jersey sanctions immunity issues raised did not justify refusing enforcement of the award in England.
· On 22 May 2026, the Court of Appeal in Tonzip Maritime (Singapore) PTE Ltd v 2 Rivers PTE Ltd clarified the operation of sanctions clauses in maritime contracts, holding that shipowners may refuse performance where they reasonably determine that compliance gives rise to a real risk of sanctions exposure, even absent a definitive finding that sanctions would in fact be breached. Reversing the first instance decision, the Court held that the relevant charterparty clause did not require owners to establish on the balance of probabilities that sanctions applied, but only that there was a reasonable basis to conclude that performance exposed them to sanctions risk. The dispute arose from a refusal to transport Russian oil cargo linked to Neftisa and alleged sanctioned interests connected to Mikhail Gutseriev, despite legal opinions provided to support the transaction’s permissibility.
GLOBAL REGULATIONS/ TOOLS UPDATE
· On 30 April 2026, OFSI imposed a £165,000 monetary penalty on Deutsche Bank AG London Branch for breaches of Regulation 12 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 arising from two payments processed in June and July 2022 totalling £635,618.75 to Okko LLC, an entity wholly owned by designated person JSC New Opportunities. The same payments had previously resulted in a £390,000 penalty against Apple Distribution International, an Irish Apple subsidiary, which had instructed payments to Okko in connection with App Store-related revenue. The Deutsche Bank decision addressed the bank’s role in processing those transactions and highlights that both the party instructing a prohibited payment and the financial institution processing it may face enforcement action. OFSI found that Deutsche Bank had made funds available to an entity owned or controlled by a designated person and identified deficiencies in sanctions screening and customer risk management, including reliance on third-party ownership and control data that did not identify the relevant links. The matter was resolved under OFSI’s new settlement framework, with the final penalty reflecting a discount for voluntary disclosure and settlement.
· On 30 April 2026, the House of Commons Library published a research briefing titled Sanctions against Russia: What has changed since January 2025? examining developments across UK, EU and US sanctions policy since the start of 2025. The paper reviews measures targeting Russia’s energy, financial and defence sectors, sanctions evasion through third countries, and the expansion of restrictions relating to Russia’s shadow fleet, while also noting increasing divergence between US sanctions policy and the approach taken by the UK and EU.
· On 28 May 2026, the FCA signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation (“OTSI”) to support cooperation and information-sharing on sanctions compliance and enforcement. The MoU provides for the FCA and OTSI to share information on suspected or actual sanctions breaches, weaknesses in firms’ systems and controls, and trade sanctions issues where joint work may assist enforcement. On the same date, the FCA published findings from its latest review of sanctions controls across UK financial services firms. While the FCA found that firms had made progress, it identified continuing weaknesses in due diligence, alert management, screening, frozen-asset controls, and licence compliance.
· On 28 May 2026, OFAC removed 76 individuals, entities and vessels from the SDN List as part of a wider review of legacy sanctions entries. Treasury stated that the removals covered, among other things, deceased individuals, vessels no longer in service, persons linked to inactive illicit finance networks, and older entries that lacked sufficient identifying information or no longer reflected an active sanctions priority.
· On 29 May 2026, OFSI added FAQ 186 to its UK Financial Sanctions FAQs, clarifying that the UK designation of Huobi Global S.A. applies to the HTX cryptocurrency exchange. OFSI stated that Huobi, which was designated on 26 May 2026 under the Russia sanctions regime, is subject to UK financial sanctions, as are entities owned or controlled by it. OFSI considers HTX to be subject to UK financial sanctions on the basis that it is owned by Huobi within the meaning of regulation 7(2)(a) of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.
CONCLUSION

May’s developments point to a busy and increasingly practical sanctions environment, with authorities focusing on Russia-related measures, targeted licensing, enforcement and regulatory coordination. The month also shows continued attention on crypto-assets, payment channels and third-country intermediaries, as well as the need for firms to maintain strong ownership and control analysis, effective screening systems and clear processes for licensed activity. Furthermore, national courts, particularly in England and Wales, continue to grapple with the legal practicalities arising from the imposition of financial and economic sanctions, especially the lengths to which counterparties must go to satisfy themselves that performing their legal obligations will not inadvertently place them in breach of relevant sanctions legislation.

MR’s monthly sanctions update will continue to monitor these developments, providing timely insight into international sanctions measures, regulatory reforms and key enforcement trends shaping the global sanctions landscape.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.

 

Middlesbrough F.C. were knocked out of the playoffs by Southampton F.C. on Tuesday 12 May and, by Friday the 15th, they were reportedly preparing for the final. Whether that preparation is required now depends on the outcome of disciplinary proceedings brought by the EFL against Southampton concerning allegations of spying in advance of the first leg of the playoff semifinal.

William Salt, a Southampton FC analyst, is alleged to have observed a Middlesbrough training session at Rockliffe Park last Thursday, within 72 hours of the first leg of their semifinal. Southampton have been charged with misconduct under Regulations 3.4 and 127.1 of the EFL’s Regulations, which respectively provide that clubs shall behave towards each other with utmost good faith, and that no club shall directly or indirectly observe, or attempt to observe, another club’s training session in the period of 72 hours prior to any match scheduled to be played between those respective clubs. There is no requirement of intent and no threshold of harm that must be caused: the prohibition is absolute.

These stricter provisions were introduced following the infamous 2019 incident involving the Leeds United manager, Marcelo Bielsa, who admitted to sending a member of staff to watch Derby County train, midway through the 2018/19 season. Leeds was fined £200,000 on 18 February 2019.

An independent disciplinary commission has been set up to hear the charges against Southampton. If the charges are established, the disciplinary commission has the power to impose a wide range of sanctions under Regulation 93.2 of the EFL Regulations.

The Powers of the Commission

The commission will hold a hearing, accepting evidence from both sides about the alleged rule-breaking by Southampton. If it decides that Southampton have breached Regulation 127, it has several options in terms of the sanctions that can be imposed on Southampton. That includes:

  • a points deduction (Regulation 93.2.7);
  • the imposition of a financial penalty payable to the League (Regulation 93.2.8); and/or
  • ordering any other sanction as the Disciplinary Commission may think fit (Regulation 93.2.12).

What Happens Next?

The Telegraph reported on 15 May that Southampton have pleaded guilty to spying on a Middlesbrough team training session. If this is the case, and much will turn on the evidence before the commission, then this hearing will be a high-stakes damage limitation exercise for Southampton.

Fans and the media are debating whether Southampton deserve to be expelled from the playoff next weekend. That power is available to the commission under Regulation 93.2.12. It remains to be seen whether the evidence that is adduced convinces the commission to use this power to expel Southampton from the playoffs. For example, recent news reports suggest that the allegations of spying are more widespread than the one instance first reported. The commission’s decision is due on 19 May, with the play-offs scheduled for 23 May.

How exactly the process will play out is uncertain. Even if the strongest sanction possible (i.e. expulsion) is adopted, the timeline does not account for Southampton’s right of appeal against the decision of the commission (or the EFL’s appeal, if Southampton receive a lesser sanction).

The Complications With an Appeal

Under the EFL rules, both parties have the right to challenge the commission’s decision to an appeal board under Regulation 95.1. The appeal board’s decision is final and cannot be challenged. The three days between the commission’s decision and the playoffs mean that an appeal, if lodged, cannot be concluded in time.

That further complicates the timelines, as clubs promoted to the Premier League become shareholders in the League at a shareholders’ meeting in early June upon transfer of shares from relegated to promoted clubs. Therefore, this issue has the possibility of affecting timelines for the Premier League, who will be observing intently.

Conclusion

While the first instance commission’s decision in the ‘Spygate’ scandal is expected on 19 May, it has the potential of playing out for longer legally. The fans, and other clubs, will be watching closely. The MR team will update you on the decision as soon as possible after it is published.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

  • Russia-focused multilateral action: EU adoption of its 20th package of sanctions against Russia, adding 120 new listings and expanding restrictions across energy, military-industrial, trade, financial services and crypto-asset sectors, alongside enhanced anti-circumvention measures targeting shadow fleet operations and third-country intermediaries; accompanying US licensing activity facilitating limited operational continuity, including in relation to Lukoil-linked assets and pre-existing oil shipments; UK amendment to an existing Russia designation.
  • Expansion of licensing and wind-down measures: Continued reliance by OFAC on general licenses to permit the orderly wind-down of transactions and limited ongoing activity across multiple regimes, including Iran, Nicaragua and Venezuela, as well as authorisations supporting administrative and day-to-day operations for US persons in Russia, reflecting a calibrated approach to maintaining core prohibitions while allowing practical disengagement and compliance with local requirements.
  • UK sanctions framework reform and enforcement focus: Publication of OFSI’s Strategy for 2026 to 2029 introducing a revised implementation and enforcement model, coupled with the Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2026 establishing a new criminal offence targeting circumvention by diversion and updating licensing grounds, procedural mechanisms and financial thresholds.
  • Strengthening of anti-circumvention controls: Introduction of UK Sanctions End-Use Controls extending licensing requirements to goods and technology at risk of onward diversion to sanctioned jurisdictions, supported by detailed government guidance emphasising risk-based due diligence, supply chain visibility and enhanced compliance obligations.
  • Guidance and general license developments: Updated UK guidance clarifying the operation of sanctions exceptions and licences across regimes, including the interaction between financial and trade restrictions; issuance of new and revised UK general licences, including a Legal Services General Licence and an insolvency-related licence concerning the Prince Group, reflecting continued refinement of licensing frameworks.
  • Geopolitical recalibration of sanctions regimes: Further easing of UK Syria sanctions, including removal of certain trade restrictions and confirmation of broader reforms aimed at supporting economic recovery, alongside targeted US measures permitting limited commercial engagement with the Government of Venezuela and associated entities.

GLOBAL SANCTIONS

AFGHANISTAN

  • On 14 and 16 April 2026, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office updated the UK Sanctions List under the Afghanistan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, making a series of variations to existing entries. The amendments relate to updates to identifying information, including names, aliases and other biographical details for designated individuals. All affected persons remain subject to asset freezes and travel bans, and the variations do not alter the underlying sanctions measures.
  • On 29 April 2026, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office updated the UK Sanctions List under the Afghanistan regime, making 17 variations to existing entries. All individuals remain subject to asset freezes and travel bans, with the updates reflecting changes to identifying information and designation details.

IRAN

  • On 24 April 2026, OFAC issued General License V under Executive Order 13902, authorising the wind-down of transactions involving Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd. The licence permits activities ordinarily incident and necessary to terminate existing dealings with the entity and its majority-owned subsidiaries until 24 May 2026, subject to conditions. In particular, any payments to blocked persons must be made into blocked, interest-bearing accounts in the United States. The measure reflects a targeted wind-down authorisation, allowing the orderly cessation of pre-existing business while maintaining broader prohibitions on dealings with sanctioned parties.

NICARAGUA

  • On 16 April 2026, OFAC issued General License No. 5 under the Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations, authorising transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of activities involving Exportadora de Metales Sociedad Anonima (EMSA) and entities in which it holds a 50 percent or greater interest. The authorisation remains in effect until 12:01 a.m. EDT on 16 May 2026, subject to the condition that any payments to blocked persons are made into blocked accounts.

RUSSIA

  • On 8 April 2026, OFAC issued General License 13Q under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, authorising certain administrative transactions necessary for the day-to-day operations of U.S. persons in Russia. The licence permits payments such as taxes, fees and import duties, as well as the receipt of permits, licences and similar authorisations, where these would otherwise be restricted under Directive 4. The measure is intended to allow continued basic operational compliance with local legal requirements, while maintaining broader prohibitions, including restrictions on dealings with blocked persons and limitations on access to accounts of key Russian state financial institutions.
  • On 14 April 2026, OFAC issued General License 128C under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, authorising certain transactions involving Lukoil retail service stations located outside Russia. The licence permits activities necessary for the continued operation, maintenance or wind-down of such stations, including the purchase of goods and services, subject to conditions. The measure reflects a targeted approach to allow limited commercial continuity outside Russia, while preserving core sanctions restrictions, including prohibitions on transfers to Russia and dealings with other blocked persons.
  • On 14 April 2026, OFAC also issued General License 130A under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, authorising transactions involving specified Lukoil entities operating in Bulgaria. The licence permits otherwise restricted dealings with these entities until 29 October 2026, reflecting a continued effort to manage the impact of sanctions on energy infrastructure and regional markets. The authorisation remains limited in scope and does not extend to other blocked affiliates or broader transactions prohibited under the Russian sanctions regime.
  • On 17 April 2026, OFAC issued General License 134B under multiple Russia-related sanctions authorities, authorising transactions necessary for the delivery and offloading of Russian-origin crude oil and petroleum products loaded onto vessels prior to 17 April 2026. The licence provides a time-limited wind-down period, allowing such cargoes to be delivered through 16 May 2026, including associated services required for safe transport and handling. The measure is intended to facilitate the orderly completion of pre-existing shipments, while maintaining restrictions on new transactions and broader sanctions prohibitions.
  • On 23 April 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted its 20th package of sanctions against Russia, introducing 120 additional listings alongside expanded economic measures targeting energy revenues, the military-industrial sector, trade and financial services, including crypto-assets. The package also includes strengthened anti-circumvention measures, new restrictions on access to sensitive technologies, and further action targeting the shadow fleet and third-country intermediaries involved in sanctions evasion.
  • On 29 April 2026, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office amended an entry on the UK Sanctions List under the Russia regime, updating the designation for one individual. The individual remains subject to asset freeze, travel ban, trust services and director disqualification measures.

SYRIA

  • On 22 April 2026, the UK Government updated its guidance on the Syria sanctions regime following amendments to the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, including the removal of restrictions relating to gold, precious metals, diamonds and luxury goods. The update builds on earlier reforms introduced in April 2025, which lifted a range of trade, financial, transport and energy-related sanctions to support Syria’s economic recovery, while maintaining targeted measures against former regime figures and associated persons. The guidance also reflects the lifting of asset freezes on certain previously designated state-linked entities, including financial institutions and energy companies, and confirms that the Government of Syria is not currently designated under UK sanctions, underscoring a continued shift towards facilitating investment and reconstruction while preserving accountability measures.

VENEZUELA

  • On 14 April 2026, OFAC issued General Licences 56 and 57 under the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, authorising certain commercial and financial activities involving the Government of Venezuela and specified state-linked entities. The measures permit U.S. persons to engage in negotiations of contingent commercial arrangements with the Government of Venezuela, as well as to provide a broad range of financial services involving designated Venezuelan banks and certain government-affiliated individuals, subject to conditions. The licences form part of a broader easing of restrictions aimed at facilitating limited commercial engagement and improving access to financial channels, while maintaining core sanctions prohibitions, including restrictions on entering into or performing contracts without further authorisation and the continued application of asset freezes and other targeted measures.

GLOBAL REGULATIONS/ TOOLS UPDATE

  • On 15 April 2026, OFSI published its Strategy for 2026–2029, setting out an updated framework for the implementation and enforcement of UK financial sanctions. The strategy introduces a new operating model built around four pillars, Promote, Enable, Respond and Change, aimed at improving compliance clarity, streamlining licensing processes, strengthening enforcement activity and embedding long-term behavioural change across regulated sectors. It also emphasises a more data-driven and intelligence-led approach, enhanced engagement with industry, and closer coordination with domestic and international partners, reflecting a broader shift towards proactive compliance support alongside more targeted and effective enforcement.
  • On 20 April 2026, the UK Government made the Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2026 (SI 2026/443) under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (SAMLA 2018) which come into force on 13 May 2026. The regulations introduce a new criminal offence aimed at addressing the risk of sanctions circumvention through diversion. The offence applies where a UK person proceeds to export goods or transfer technology after being notified by the Secretary of State that there is a risk those items could be diverted to a sanctioned destination or end user, without first obtaining a licence. The Regulations implement these end-use controls across a number of trade sanctions regimes, including those relating to Russia, Belarus, Iran, Syria and Myanmar, with licence applications to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The amendments also revise the “prior obligations” licensing ground so that obligations are no longer limited to being discharged using a designated person’s frozen funds or by that person alone, and remove that ground entirely from the Afghanistan regime. Additional changes include updating financial thresholds for certain regulated sectors, allowing licensing decisions to be communicated electronically, clarifying the scope of the debt payment exception, and removing outdated statutory references, reflecting a broader effort to enhance the effectiveness and operability of the UK sanctions framework.
  • On 22 April 2026, the UK Government introduced new Sanctions End-Use Controls and issued guidance for businesses, establishing a licensing requirement where exporters are aware, or have been notified, that goods or technology exported to non-sanctioned countries may ultimately be diverted to sanctioned destinations or end users. The measures are intended to address circumvention risks and apply to items not otherwise subject to existing military or dual-use export controls, thereby expanding the scope of regulated activity. The guidance outlines compliance expectations, including responding to government notifications, undertaking risk-based due diligence on end use and end users, and maintaining appropriate records, reflecting an increased emphasis on supply chain scrutiny and enforcement.
  • On 23 April 2026, the UK Government updated its guidance on how to use exceptions and licences to comply with sanctions, providing consolidated direction across financial, trade and transport regimes. The guidance clarifies the distinction between “exceptions”, which operate as automatic exemptions where specific conditions are met, and “licences”, which constitute formal authorisation to undertake otherwise prohibited activities. It also outlines the role of different competent authorities in issuing licences across regimes and emphasises the need for businesses to assess applicability carefully, including compliance with any notification and record-keeping requirements attached to exceptions. The update highlights the potential for overlapping financial and trade restrictions, reinforcing the importance of ensuring that all necessary permissions are obtained before proceeding with sanctioned activities. The guidance can be found here.

General Licences

General Licence INT/2026/9512597 (Legal Services), issued 24 April 2026

OFSI issued General Licence INT/2026/9512597, introducing a new framework permitting UK legal firms and counsel to receive payment from designated persons for legal services, subject to specified conditions. The licence replaces the previous Legal Services General Licence expiring on 28 April 2026, takes effect from 29 April 2026, and remains in force until 28 October 2026, with associated reporting and record-keeping requirements applying.

General Licence INT/2026/9491628 (Prince Group Insolvency), issued 14 April 2026

This licence permits insolvency-related payments and activities in connection with the sanctioned Prince Group and its subsidiaries, including the making, receiving and processing of payments necessary for insolvency proceedings, without breaching UK financial sanctions. It applies to insolvency practitioners, relevant institutions and other persons involved in such proceedings, provided that any funds or economic resources remain frozen and are not made available for the benefit of designated persons except as permitted. The licence imposes notification requirements to HM Treasury within 14 days of relevant activity and requires records to be maintained, reflecting a targeted approach to facilitate orderly insolvency processes while preserving asset freeze restrictions.

CONCLUSION

April’s developments highlight the increasing focus by US, UK and EU authorities on targeted licensing, regulatory reform and enhanced anti-circumvention tools as key mechanisms for shaping the global sanctions landscape. The expanded use of general licences to facilitate wind-downs and limited commercial activity, alongside significant EU measures relating to Russia, reflects a continued effort to balance geopolitical objectives with practical compliance considerations. At the same time, the UK’s introduction of new end-use controls and updated enforcement strategy signals a more proactive and operationally focused approach to sanctions implementation, with a growing emphasis on supply chain scrutiny and risk-based compliance. These developments contribute to an increasingly complex and enforcement-driven environment for businesses and financial institutions operating across jurisdictions. MR’s monthly sanctions update will continue to monitor these developments, providing timely insight into international sanctions measures, regulatory reforms and key enforcement trends shaping the global sanctions landscape.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.

The imposition of sanctions following Russia’s war on Ukraine resulted in a flurry of commercial cases. While these commercial decisions have been useful in guiding parties’ approach to sanctions implementation, the clearest guidance on OFSI’s approach comes from enforcement cases, which have been rarer.

In one such recent case, OFSI has imposed a £390,000 penalty on Apple Distribution International Limited (ADI), an Irish-incorporated subsidiary of Apple Inc., for making funds available to an entity owned or controlled by a designated person in breach of regulation 12 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.

This is the first case under OFSI’s settlement regime and is a useful illustration of how UK sanctions can apply to non-UK entities, as well as OFSI’s approach in practice.

Background

ADI operates Apple’s App Store in Europe and the Middle East. It collects revenues from the App Store and instructs payments to app developers through a UK bank account; one of those developers was a Russian media streaming business, Okko LLC (Okko).

Okko had previously been owned by Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank, which the UK designated in April 2022. In May 2022, Sberbank sold Okko to a newly created entity, JSC New Opportunities, which was itself designated on 29 June 2022. From that point, Okko was again subject to asset-freeze restrictions as a wholly owned subsidiary of a designated person.

ADI made two payments to Okko from the UK account: Payment A was instructed on 6 June 2022 and released on 30 June 2022; Payment B was instructed on 30 June 2022 and released on 28 July 2022, by which point JSC New Opportunities had been designated for approximately a month. The total amount transferred was £635,618.75.

Jurisdiction and strict liability

ADI is not subject to UK sanctions law as it is incorporated in Ireland. However, its conduct was treated as occurring in the UK on the basis that ADI had instructed a UK bank to make the payments. As UK sanctions regimes apply to any conduct within the UK, the instruction of a UK bank triggers the application of UK sanctions.

The strict liability regime was introduced in 2022, by means of amendments to the Policing and Crime Act 2017, after which an entity is liable for breaches of sanctions regimes even if it had no knowledge of the breach or reasonable cause to suspect one. Given the payments to Okko were made following its designation, OFSI found that ADI was liable despite the fact that it had neither knowledge of the breach nor reasonable cause to suspect one. Under the Enforcement Guidance, OFSI found the breach to be “serious” rather than “most serious”. Further, in its assessment of the case, OFSI considered several factors, and assessed their relevance to aggravation or mitigation, which then informs how seriously OFSI views a case.

Aggravating factors

In this case, OFSI found that there were several aggravating factors.

First, ADI had a compliance framework in place which relied on self-certification and third-party due diligence providers; OFSI’s view was that it was inadequate for the sanctions climate at the time of breach because of Russian corporate ownership changing rapidly following the invasion of Ukraine. Contemporaneous open-source reporting described Sberbank’s sale of its assets and highlighted that JSC New Opportunities had been created specifically to acquire them. These factors were not identified by the third-party due diligence mechanisms in place.

OFSI also concluded that ADI failed to affirmatively request ownership information from Russian developers, which would have materially increased the chance of identifying the risk, and was considered an aggravating factor. OFSI also reiterated that ADI, as the entity making the payments, remained responsible for the adequacy of its own controls and had ultimate responsibility for ensuring sanctions compliance.

The fact that ADI made two previous payments to Okko in April 2022 (while it was designated), prior to the strict liability regime coming into force, was also considered an aggravating factor. Lastly, Russia sanctions were also treated as a strategic UK priority, which added to the weight given to the seriousness of the breach.

Mitigation

There were also several mitigating factors in this case. OFSI accepted that ADI had neither intent, knowledge, nor reasonable cause to suspect the breach. Payment A was completed on the day of designation, in a window so narrow that OFSI acknowledged automated systems would not necessarily be expected to catch it.

ADI also made a voluntary disclosure in October 2022, cooperated fully with the investigation, and subsequently enhanced its framework, including introducing a process to require Russian developers to provide direct and indirect ownership information at onboarding and periodically thereafter. Those steps were considered as mitigating factors when OFSI calculated the penalty.

Penalty and settlement

The baseline penalty was £600,000 against a statutory maximum of £1,000,000. A reduction of 35% was applied to reflect voluntary disclosure and ADI’s agreement to settle under the transitional arrangements, producing a final penalty of £390,000. The position has since changed. Under OFSI’s updated February 2026 enforcement guidance, voluntary disclosure is capped at 30% and a separate 20% discount applies for settlement.

Settlement itself is a new mechanism, and this is the first time OFSI has used it. Settlement requires the subject to pay the penalty as imposed and to waive rights of review and appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In return, the subject may contribute to the published case summary and will receive the settlement discount if agreement is reached within 30 business days. Firms facing investigation should consider whether to engage early to obtain the 20% discount.

Conclusion

Firms are under continued obligation to comply with sanctions. Where any part of the conduct engages the UK’s jurisdiction, including the payment mechanics, UK sanctions come into operation. Parties should note the following:

  1. Ongoing awareness of, and compliance with, UK sanctions regimes remains necessary. The strict liability regime means lack of knowledge of the breach or intent to cause it is not an excuse.
  2. Any act taking place within the UK requires compliance with UK sanctions, including the use of UK banks. Any business routing payments through UK financial infrastructure should treat UK sanctions obligations as directly applicable to it.
  3. Firms have a continuing obligation to assess ownership and control, especially where ownership structures are complex, opaque, or subject to change.
  4. Third-party providers are helpful, but they do not displace responsibility away from the party using them. The firm using the provider is still responsible for a sanctions breach, if the data is incomplete or delayed. Merely adopting third-party vendors will not reduce a firm’s liability.
  5. Where a potential breach is identified, voluntary disclosure remains one of the most effective tools available to obtain a reduced penalty and OFSI expects disclosure promptly after discovery. Firms should also be aware of the settlement framework following the demonstration of its practical application. Given that the discount narrows if settlement is not reached within 30 business days, there is a real incentive to engage early.

This blog post is not offered, and should not be relied on, as legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice in specific situations.